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THE TERRORIST INFORMANT 
Wadie E. Said∗ 
Abstract: A man sets himself on fire in front of the White House in a dispute with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He has been working as an informant for the FBI in a 
high-profile terrorism prosecution and is unhappy with the $100,000 he has been paid so far. 
He has also been recently convicted of bank fraud. As a result, the government declines to 
call him as a witness, given the damage his actions have on his credibility and 
trustworthiness. This incident underscores the difficulty inherent in relying on paid 
informants to drive a prosecution, where material considerations such as money and legal 
assistance are often the price the government pays for an informant’s services. In the years 
since September 11, 2001, informants have been at the heart of many major terrorism 
prosecutions. The entrapment defense, perhaps the only legal tool available to defendants in 
such prosecutions, has proven ineffective. This is evident when one considers the context of 
generally heightened suspicion of the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States. 
Further, a closer look at several of these prosecutions reveals repeated instances of suggestive 
and provocative activity by informants geared at obtaining a conviction, calling into question 
whether a genuine threat to U.S. national security actually existed in the first place. This 
Article argues that the government should cease its current practice of using informants to 
generate terrorism prosecutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism-related offenses often involve individuals operating in 
close secrecy, a predicament that requires law enforcement officials to 
think creatively about the means of extracting information about a 
particular terrorist plot or group. This dynamic has in turn led to the 
increased use of confidential informants1 in criminal terrorism 
prosecutions throughout the United States in the years following 
September 11, 2001 (9/11).2 Several high-profile federal trials in recent 
years highlight the risks inherent in using an informant to make a case. 
These risks are particularly evident in the terrorism arena, where a 
complex mix of vigilance, concern for national security, ignorance, and 
prejudice can lead law enforcement agents and prosecutors to believe a 
threat exists where it does not. 
A close reading of post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions demonstrates two 
distinct, yet interrelated, trends. First, the conduct of informants in 
general raises the issue of entrapment in a direct and pointed manner. 
                                                     
1. This Article analyzes the use of informants—“people who never intended to aid their alleged 
terrorist companions”—as distinguished from cooperators—those who “conspired with terrorists at 
one point but were induced to cooperate with law enforcement.” See CTR. ON LAW & SECURITY, 
N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 
2009, at 43 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT CARD 2009], available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/ 
publications/TTRCFinalJan14.pdf. 
2. See CTR. ON LAW & SECURITY, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2010, at 20 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT CARD 2010] (“Of the 
156 prosecutions of defendants implicated in the top 50 plots [after September 11, 2001], 
informants were relied on in 97 of them, or 62%”), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/ 
publications/TTRC2010Final.pdf. 
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Whether a defendant intended to commit a crime or an informant 
actually entrapped a defendant is a legitimate query that may be difficult 
to answer. Second, regardless of whether an informant’s conduct legally 
constitutes entrapment, several of the post-9/11 cases highlight situations 
in which the existence of any real threat to national security was 
questionable. Where the very existence of a threat is doubtful, it is 
appropriate to question the efficacy and feasibility of how informants 
purport to investigate suspected terrorists when their ability to discern 
true criminality seems subordinated to other, less altruistic concerns. 
While the academic literature surrounding the use of informants in 
terrorism prosecutions is relatively undeveloped, any study of the 
relevant cases must take into account the unique context in which those 
cases arise. The use of confidential informants in criminal cases is 
nothing new.3 Currently, informants are used most frequently to 
prosecute drug trafficking and dealing in cases that share many 
characteristics with terrorism investigations. In the realm of drug 
trafficking and dealing, confidential informants often have incentives to 
lie because they are paid or compensated in the form of reduced 
sentences, and verifying the information they provide can prove difficult 
at best.4 Legal scholars have focused on the prevalent use of informants 
in drug investigations, producing a sophisticated and detailed critique of 
the deleterious effects of informant use on disadvantaged youth of color 
and the communities in which they live.5 
The use of informants by law enforcement in the War on Drugs has 
resulted in significant abuses; these abuses are magnified in the terrorism 
context.6 Informant recruitment occurs generally in the shadows, 
                                                     
3. The U.S. Supreme Court first granted constitutional imprimatur to the use of confidential 
informants in 1966. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303–04 (1966) (ruling that use of a 
confidential informant does not violate any principle of the Fourth Amendment and that any 
statements made to the informant were voluntary and did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment). 
4. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27–29 (2009) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, SNITCHING]. 
5. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 79–100 (2009) 
(discussing the negative role informants play in underprivileged communities and advocating 
noncooperation with the police in most situations when they request that someone become a 
“snitch”); NATAPOFF, SNITCHING, supra note 4, at 101–19 (detailing how the use of “snitches” can 
lead to more distrust and violence in inner-city communities, as well as an unwillingness to 
cooperate with the police); Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s 
“Wars” on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1170–76 (2009) (highlighting 
the particular danger of using juvenile informants, given their youth and susceptibility to violent 
reprisal); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 645, 683–96 (2004) (analyzing the various harms to disadvantaged communities that 
are riddled with informants). 
6. See infra Part III.B. 
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targeting primarily poor young men of color in America’s inner cities, a 
traditionally underrepresented and disenfranchised group within 
mainstream society.7 The harsh penalties that await defendants in drug 
cases, especially those charged with non-violent offenses, are perhaps 
the most unfortunate consequence of the War on Drugs.8 Using 
informants to investigate low-level drug crime may be unfair, 
particularly when a defendant is facing an unusually harsh sentence, but 
it occurs in a time when the racial profiling of African-American or 
Latino youth has been generally renounced.9 In the terrorism context, by 
contrast, the American public is anything but apathetic toward the threat 
of terrorism. In fact, evidence suggests that there is widespread support 
for or tolerance of the racial profiling of Arab- and Muslim-Americans 
for national security purposes.10 Accordingly, certain investigative 
tactics seem to be consistent with this public support. For example, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has used infiltrators and 
informants to monitor the workings of mosques around the country, 
despite no articulable suspicion linking the mosque or its congregants to 
violent activity.11 
A reflection on terrorism prosecutions post-9/11 reveals that simply 
because the government invests tremendous resources in 
counterterrorism, law enforcement does not mean terrorism is always—
or even often—occurring or being planned. While there is much we do 
not know about the roles informants play in most national security 
operations, a review of several major terrorism prosecutions paints a 
                                                     
7. See infra Part III.B. 
8. See James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1004–
09 (2010) (reviewing PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009)). 
9. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States, in RACE LAW STORIES 445–
48 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008) (discussing the political context in which 
police agencies abandoned the use of racial profiling in traditional law enforcement, only to see it 
return as a tool to combat terrorism after September 11, 2001); Asli Ü Bâli, Changes in Immigration 
Law and Practice After September 11: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 161, 163–64 (2003) (noting the reemergence of racial profiling against people of Middle 
Eastern and South Asian origin in the wake of September 11, 2001); R. Richard Banks, Beyond 
Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 574–75 (2003) (detailing the 
successful campaign against racial profiling in the traditional law enforcement realm). 
10. See John Tehranian, The Last Minstrel Show? Racial Profiling, the War on Terrorism and the 
Mass Media, 41 CONN. L. REV. 781, 784 (2009) (“Support for racial profiling in the war on 
terrorism continues unabated, despite its underlying irrationality, because of fear—an emotion that 
has animated ill-conceived and discriminatory government projects since time immemorial. The 
specter of another 9/11 causes otherwise sound policy makers to support anti-terrorism policies that 
target individuals of Middle-Eastern descent.”). 
11. See infra Part II.B. 
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troubling picture of the informants’ performance.12 Using informants to 
create cases is a poor substitute for traditional investigatory techniques 
and can implicate a defendant’s religious and political beliefs in a 
manner that suggests that whole communities are suspect. In evaluating 
the efficacy of terrorism prosecutions, an analysis of informants’ roles in 
several high-profile cases reflects current fears and prejudices as to what 
characteristics constitute a terrorist. When the archetypical terrorist 
assumes a certain race and religion in the popular imagination, deciding 
whether an informant has entrapped that individual becomes a fraught 
exercise demanding a close look at those preconceived notions and their 
effect on the legal analysis in a given case. 
This Article argues that using informants to generate federal terrorism 
prosecutions in the absence of any articulable suspicion should end 
because it typically leads to cases in which there is, at best, a real 
question about whether the defendant would have broken the law but for 
the informant’s prodding. At worst, the practice raises real questions 
about a defendant’s guilt, as several of the cases discussed in this Article 
will demonstrate. Specifically, this Article calls for a halt to the practice 
of allowing an individual untrained in law enforcement techniques to 
target individuals of an already suspect minority. Given the context in 
which terrorism prosecutions occur, the experience of using informants 
reveals that the practice arguably does nothing to interdict actual violent 
activity. 
Part I of this Article focuses on the development of entrapment as a 
legal doctrine and the difficulties of applying the doctrine within the 
context of a terrorism prosecution. Part II examines legal standards as 
well as popular conceptions of who a terrorist is and, in so doing, 
emphasizes the difficulties inherent in articulating a successful 
entrapment defense when confronting allegations of terrorism. Part III 
discusses the history of informant use in the counterterrorism setting and 
examines cases involving the use of informants before and after 9/11. 
This Part features an extended discussion of several prosecutions that 
typify the problems associated with relying on an informant to build a 
case in the counterterrorism context. Part IV analyzes the trends revealed 
by the cases discussed in Part III and discusses the reasons why 
investigators should cease informant use in cases generated by the 
informants themselves without a previous articulable suspicion of 
terrorist activities to cause the government to investigate the suspect.13 
                                                     
12. See NATAPOFF, SNITCHING, supra note 4, at 167–68. 
13. Although the term has “never [been] properly defined” by the Supreme Court, this Article 
uses “articulable suspicion” in this context to mean some suspicious characteristic other than being 
 
120210_Said_Final[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2010  1:14 AM 
692 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:687 
 
I. ENTRAPMENT: OPERATIVE LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. History 
The history of the entrapment doctrine has been discussed extensively 
in academic literature,14 so only a short explication of the relevant legal 
precedents is in order. Entrapment is a judicially created doctrine not 
typically codified by statute.15 The first instance of a federal court 
recognizing an entrapment defense was in 1915 in Woo Wai v. United 
States.16 There, the Ninth Circuit evaluated a government scheme to 
induce a Chinese resident of San Francisco to smuggle Chinese 
immigrants into the United States across the Mexican border.17 Key to 
the Ninth Circuit’s recognition of the defense was the length of time—
one and a half years—over which the government agents tried to 
convince the defendant to participate in the plan before he “finally 
assented to enter into the scheme which had been so assiduously and 
persistently urged upon him.”18 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court first acknowledged the defense of 
entrapment in federal criminal law in 1928,19 it was not until 1932 that it 
actually upheld the defense in Sorrells v. United States.20 In this 
Prohibition-era decision, a government agent posed as a fellow World 
War I veteran as part of an elaborate ruse to get Sorrells, a farmer, to 
obtain whiskey for him; after the agent asked several times for over an 
hour, Sorrells finally relented and produced a five-dollar jug of 
                                                     
an Arab or Muslim. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth 
Amendment 47 (Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 317, (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1665562 (arguing that the term “individualized 
suspicion” should be abandoned). 
14. See, e.g., Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the Entrapment Defense, 
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 257, 278–85 (2003) (discussing the origin of the doctrine in the lower 
courts). 
15. Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 
831 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 591 
(2009). 
16. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). 
17. Id. at 414 (“The fact that a detective or other person suspected that the defendant was about to 
commit a crime, and prepared for his detection, as a result of which he was entrapped in its 
commission, is no excuse, if the defendant alone conceived the original criminal design.” (quotation 
marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428 n.5 (1973); Roiphe, supra 
note 14, at 282. 
18. See Woo Wai, 223 F. at 414. 
19. See Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 419–20 (1928). 
20. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
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whiskey.21 While recognizing that “[a]rtifice and stratagem may be 
employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises,” the Court 
noted that “[a] different question is presented when the criminal design 
originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the 
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense 
and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.”22 
In 1958, the Court again upheld the entrapment defense in Sherman v. 
United States,23 a case involving a government informant’s ultimately 
successful efforts to persuade a recovering drug addict to supply him 
with narcotics on the basis that the informant was allegedly “suffering” 
and “not responding to treatment.”24 The Court explicitly reaffirmed its 
ruling in Sorrells, and further elaborated that “[t]o determine whether 
entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap 
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.”25 In a 
subsequent decision upholding the Sorrells-Sherman approach to 
entrapment, the Supreme Court in United States v. Russell26 explained 
that “the principal element in the defense of entrapment [is] the 
defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.”27 This focus on a 
defendant’s propensity or “predisposition” to commit the crime came to 
be dubbed the “subjective” test for entrapment.28 The subjective test is 
currently employed by the federal courts and the majority of state 
jurisdictions.29 
The subjective test stands in contrast to what has been dubbed the 
“objective”30 test for entrapment, which, rather than focusing on a 
defendant’s predisposition to commit a given crime, centers on the 
conduct of government actors.31 Justice Brandeis was the first to 
articulate the principles of the objective test, albeit in dissent, when the 
issue of entrapment first came before the Court in 1928 in Casey v. 
                                                     
21. Id. at 439–40.  
22. Id. at 441–42. 
23. 356 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1958).  
24. Id. at 371. 
25. Id. at 372. 
26. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
27. Id. at 433. 
28. Id. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
29. See Andrew Carlon, Note, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1081, 1087 (2007); Dillof, supra note 15, at 831. 
30. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
31. Id. 
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United States.32 Significant minorities of the Court in Sorrells, Sherman, 
and Russell unsuccessfully advocated for the adoption of the objective 
test.33 While most academic commentators endorse the objective test,34 it 
has never been upheld by the Supreme Court and is in force only in a 
minority of state jurisdictions and in the Model Penal Code.35 Somewhat 
related to the objective test is a motion to dismiss an indictment based on 
“outrageous” government conduct,36 but the bar for obtaining relief is set 
so high that it occurs only in the most extreme cases, and even then only 
rarely.37 
B. Jacobson v. United States 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent foray into the contours of the 
entrapment doctrine upheld the subjective test, thereby reaffirming the 
Sorrells-Sherman approach. In Jacobson v. United States,38 the Court 
confronted the case of “a 56-year-old veteran-turned-farmer who 
supported his elderly father in Nebraska” who was convicted of ordering 
child pornography after a twenty-six-month-long government 
investigation involving a series of inquiries and solicitations regarding 
                                                     
32. 276 U.S. 413, 423–25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the 
Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1568–69 (1982) (“Brandeis was less 
concerned with providing a defense for unwary criminals than with protecting the courts from 
becoming unwilling parties in the prosecution of individuals whose crimes were induced by 
governmental officials . . . . In Brandeis’s view, the defendant’s state of mind was irrelevant to the 
question of whether the prosecution should go forward. Here, then, lay the foundation for an 
objective approach to entrapment theory.”). 
33. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436–38 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 441, 450 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378–79 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
34. Carlon, supra note 29, at 1090.  
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (2001); Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 125, 151–52 (2008) (“Due process, however, is the entire concern of the objective test; some 
courts actually call it the ‘due process test.’” (citation omitted)). 
36. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 431–32 (1973) (“[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in 
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would 
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction . . . .”) (citing 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)); United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1199 (9th 
Cir. 2008). Rochin also first applied the roughly similar “shocks-the-conscience” test in the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment contexts. See Wadie E. Said, Coercing Voluntariness, 85 IND. L.J. 1, 7–10 
(2010). 
37. See Williams, 547 F.3d at 1200 (noting conduct must “‘violate fundamental fairness’ or 
‘shock the universal sense of justice mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.’” (citations and alterations omitted)); see also NATAPOFF, SNITCHING, supra note 4, at 
61. 
38. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).  
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his sexual proclivities.39 In finding that Jacobson had been entrapped, the 
Court highlighted “2 1/2 years [of] repeated efforts by two Government 
agencies, through five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen pal, to 
explore petitioner’s willingness to break the . . . law by ordering sexually 
explicit photographs of children through the mail.”40 
There were two critical facts that led the Court to find that entrapment 
had occurred. First, Jacobson had come to the government’s attention 
because he had previously ordered two magazines depicting underage 
naked boys from a California bookstore at a time when possession of 
such materials was legal.41 The government began its investigation after 
Congress had outlawed receiving sexually explicit depictions of 
children, such as those Jacobson had legally ordered in the past.42 
Second, government investigators framed their false inquiries and 
solicitations to him as emanating from groups challenging government 
censorship and protecting individual rights.43 This not only appealed to 
his sexual desires but also amounted to strong pressure to join in a 
political effort to change the law.44 
These factors, when coupled with the lengthy nature of the 
government’s investigation, led the Court to endorse Jacobson’s 
entrapment defense.45 The Court clarified that the issue of a defendant’s 
predisposition is to be evaluated prior to his being approached by the 
government.46 Perhaps what is most remarkable about the Jacobson 
                                                     
39. Id. at 542–43. 
40. Id. at 543.  
41. Id. at 542–43. 
42. Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin, The Story of Jacobson v. United States: Catching Criminals or 
Creating Crime, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES (Robert Weisberg & Donna K. Coker eds., 
forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725281. 
43. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542–47; see also Chin, supra note 42. 
44. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 552. Specifically, the Court remarked: 
On the other hand, the strong arguable inference is that, by waving the banner of individual 
rights and disparaging the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict the availability 
of sexually explicit materials, the Government not only excited petitioner’s interest in sexually 
explicit materials banned by law but also exerted substantial pressure on petitioner to obtain 
and read such material as part of a fight against censorship and the infringement of individual 
rights. For instance, [the Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow, a fictitious organization 
invented by the Government during its investigation] described itself as “an organization 
founded to protect and promote sexual freedom and freedom of choice” and stated that the 
most appropriate means to accomplish [its] objectives is to promote honest dialogue among 
concerned individuals and to continue its lobbying efforts with State Legislators.” These 
lobbying efforts were to be financed through catalog sales. Mailings from the equally fictitious 
American Hedonist Society and the correspondence from the nonexistent Carl Long endorsed 
these themes. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
45. Id. at 551–54. 
46. Id. at 548–49; see also Chin, supra note 42, at 23 (noting that while there was a dispute as to 
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opinion is that the Court ruled in favor of an individual convicted of a 
child pornography offense, a class of crime regarded as particularly 
reprehensible by society at large.47 Although Jacobson was a 5–4 
decision over a spirited dissent,48 it was heralded as the case that 
resurrected the entrapment defense, which had long lain dormant.49 
C. Predisposition 
The Supreme Court has clearly recognized entrapment as a defense 
and has articulated that the subjective test is the operative legal inquiry 
in federal courts. The three opinions upholding the entrapment defense 
over the past eighty years, however, have not answered the question of 
how to prove or disprove a suspect’s predisposition. Essentially, the 
predisposition inquiry attempts to predict what a given defendant would 
have done had law enforcement agents not intervened.50 Professor 
Ronald Allen has argued that the predisposition inquiry is meaningless 
in that only a saint would not commit a crime given the right 
inducement; Allen urges that the real question is whether one’s price is 
reasonable enough to conclude that entrapment has occurred, given law 
enforcement’s conduct.51 Whatever “predisposition” means—a topic that 
                                                     
whether this was a novel holding or based on precedent, language in Sherman supported the 
Jacobson majority’s position, and in any event, the government “conceded the point at oral 
argument”).  
47. See Chin, supra note 42, at 23 (“The Court recognized that even someone who was ultimately 
persuaded to do something quite wrong could be the beneficiary of the defense.”). 
48. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 554 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Keith Jacobson was offered only two 
opportunities to buy child pornography through the mail. Both times, he ordered. Both times, he 
asked for opportunities to buy more. He needed no Government agent to coax, threaten, or persuade 
him; no one played on his sympathies, friendship, or suggested that his committing the crime would 
further a greater good. In fact, no Government agent even contacted him face to face. The 
Government contends that from the enthusiasm with which Mr. Jacobson responded to the chance to 
commit a crime, a reasonable jury could permissibly infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he was 
predisposed to commit the crime. I agree.”). 
49. Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the (Almost) Dead, the Entrapment Defense, 47 FLA. L. 
REV. 205, 228–33 (1995). 
50. See, e.g., Kevin A. Smith, Note, Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 759, 761 (2005). 
51. Ronald J. Allen, Melissa Luttrell & Anne Kreeger, Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 413 (1999) (“The real point is that talk of ‘predisposition’ is meaningless and 
commits an existential fallacy. A person who takes the bait has had his price met; a person who does 
not, has not. But, the person who does not take the bait almost surely would take a higher, even if 
greatly higher, bait. The failure to take this one is evidence of his price, but not of predisposition.”); 
see also Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, 
73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1040 (1987) (“There is arguably a point at which any individual will commit 
crime if the risks are low enough and the rewards inviting enough.”). But see Smith, supra note 50, 
at 761 n.11 (criticizing this position as “circular”). 
120210_Said_Final[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2010  1:14 AM 
2010] THE TERRORIST INFORMANT 697 
 
has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention—there remains a 
great deal of confusion regarding how it can be proved or disproved, as 
the case may be.52 
In the context of a terrorism prosecution, it is not difficult to imagine 
how a defendant’s statements can be used to prove predisposition, given 
the typical ideological and political nature of terrorism charges. 
Demonstrating predisposition can therefore become a referendum on a 
defendant’s political or religious views when the inquiry focuses on how 
sympathetic the defendant is to terrorist objectives.53 An analysis of 
predisposition to commit a given crime entails an inquiry into an 
individual’s general character, something the law normally rejects.54 The 
more an individual can be shown to be predisposed to commit crime—
”through proof of prior crimes, prior bad acts, bad reputation, or other 
evidence of bad character”—the more extreme the government can be in 
its inducements to commit the crime.55 
A significant attempt by the lower courts to refine the predisposition 
test came in United States v. Hollingsworth.56 In Hollingsworth, a money 
laundering case involving complex facts, Judge Richard Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit articulated what he believed was required by Jacobson, 
namely, that predisposition is not merely the willingness to commit the 
crime, but also the ability to do so without the government’s help.57 This 
is referred to as “positional” predisposition.58 The rationale behind 
Hollingsworth is rooted in a belief that the government creates a serious 
risk of inducing crime when it provides the means for individuals to 
carry out crimes that they otherwise would not have been able to 
commit.59 
                                                     
52. Richard H. McAdams, Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v. Hollingsworth, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (2007) (arguing that the concept of predisposition “is difficult; many 
cases and a vast commentary have tried to clarify it”). 
53. See infra Part II, notes 63–135 and accompanying text. 
54. Carlson, supra note 51, at 1039. 
55. Id. (“More troubling, though, is the uncontrolled license that the predisposition test gives to 
the government to use even the most extreme inducements against persons whose ‘general lifestyle 
and pattern of behavior are associated with criminality.’”(citations omitted)). 
56. 9 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’d en banc, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199–1200 (7th Cir. 1994). 
57. See id., 27 F.3d at 1200; see also McAdams, supra note 52, at 1797; Ian J. McLoughlin, Note, 
The Meaning of Predisposition in Practice, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (1999). 
58. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200 (“[Predisposition] has positional as well as dispositional 
force . . . . The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training or experience or 
occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the government had not induced him to commit 
the crime some criminal would have done so . . . .”). 
59. McAdams, supra note 52, at 1807–08. 
120210_Said_Final[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2010  1:14 AM 
698 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:687 
 
The rationale of Hollingsworth, a 6–5 decision by the en banc court, 
has not been adopted outside of the Seventh Circuit,60 and the Ninth 
Circuit has expressly rejected the “positional” predisposition test.61 
Nevertheless, Hollingsworth represents a departure from the quixotic 
debates in courts and academia on predisposition. It also raises the very 
salient question of culpability when a defendant may have been willing 
to commit a crime but lacked the realistic means to perpetrate it, and 
would not have sought out those means but for the government’s 
assistance. In the scope of a terrorism prosecution, evaluating positional 
predisposition can serve the valuable goal of eliminating liability based 
solely on a defendant’s constitutionally protected political views, 
religious beliefs, or both. Hollingsworth’s limited acceptance outside the 
Seventh Circuit, however, does not allow for a full airing of this 
hypothesis.62 
II. ATTENDANT ASSUMPTIONS IN EVALUATING THE 
TERRORIST THREAT 
The entrapment analysis does not occur in a vacuum in any context, 
and a terrorism prosecution is no exception to this general rule. 
Exploring society’s attendant assumptions as to who is a terrorist is 
crucial for evaluating the effectiveness of the entrapment doctrine, as 
well as for understanding the role that bias plays in creating those 
assumptions. While there has been serious and sustained academic 
commentary analyzing how Arab and Muslim communities in the 
United States have been racialized as terrorists, that analysis has not yet 
been incorporated into the discussion of informant use by the 
government. A thorough accounting of informant use requires an 
examination of that analysis and how it affects the resulting 
prosecutions. Identifying the role bias plays in determining who society 
believes is a terrorist can allow for a more accurate determination of true 
threats to national security, and can minimize the potential for 
convicting individuals based solely on their political or religious views. 
                                                     
60. Id. at 1795–96 n.6 (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit indicating an initial adoption of the 
positional test in a case that was later vacated, then subsequently declining to revisit the issue; also 
noting that the Fourth Circuit expressly refused to rule on the matter). 
61. Thickstun v. United States, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997). 
62. Additionally, there is the issue of how Judge Posner himself would respond to the application 
of the positional predisposition test for entrapment in a terrorism prosecution, given his advocating 
for expanded governmental powers to tackle the problem of terrorist violence. See McAdams, supra 
note 52, at 1809 n.63 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006)). 
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A. Academic Commentary: The Terrorism Context 
To date, there are only two articles in American law reviews that 
focus on the topic of informant use in terrorism prosecutions, both of 
recent vintage.63 The first article on the subject,64 by Professor Dru 
Stevenson, approaches the topic of entrapment and terrorism from a law 
and economics perspective.65 
Professor Stevenson expressly omits certain factors and phenomena 
from his analysis66 and explains the scope of his article as follows: 
This Article does not address the ethical or moral problems with 
undercover government operations, many of which are obvious: 
the problem of government deception, the problem of the 
government creating crimes that would not otherwise have 
occurred, the conceptual asymmetry of recognizing government 
entrapment while ignoring the problem of private entrapment, 
the role of moral luck in the outcomes, among others. Other 
commentators cover these moral issues comprehensively, and 
such deontological arguments must stand on their own, rather 
than be pitted against teleological (utilitarian) concerns as if they 
were offsetting disutilities. The fact that something is wrong 
does not offset its social value; it makes the social value 
irrelevant or out of bounds. This Article explores the best 
version of the rule, from a pragmatic standpoint, and is not a 
moral endorsement of the things undercover agents may do. 
Similarly, this Article skirts the obvious moral and ethical 
quandaries that often arise in antiterrorism efforts, such as ethnic 
or religious profiling, protection of international scoundrels 
because of their “usefulness” as informants, prolonged detention 
of terror suspects without due process, or the use of torture to 
extract information about upcoming attacks. These are very 
appropriate subjects for academic inquiry but are outside the 
                                                     
63. Jon Sherman, “A Person Otherwise Innocent”: Policing Entrapment in Preventative, 
Undercover Counterterrorism Investigations, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1475 (2009); Stevenson, supra 
note 35. 
64. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 129 (“[T]his is the first academic article to consider this specific 
issue in depth.”).  
65. Id. at 146. The second article, by Jon Sherman, analyzes recent terrorism prosecutions from a 
more critical perspective than Professor Stevenson, and concludes by providing several suggestions 
that might make informant use more effective and less suspect. See Sherman, supra note 63, at 
1499–510. 
66. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 146. 
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scope of this Article, even though they may be relevant in the 
same adjudications in which this Article is relevant.67 
This statement misses a valuable opportunity to engage with an 
important aspect of informant use. Given the government’s tremendous 
power and the concomitant asymmetrical relationship between its agents 
and the target suspect, any analysis of entrapment must consider the 
government’s role in creating crime.68 But to take Professor Stevenson at 
his word, it is fair to assume that it is worthwhile to define the precise 
contours of the optimal entrapment defense. 
In conducting a search for the best entrapment rule in the terrorism 
context, Professor Stevenson arrives at a curious conclusion. He 
contends “that given the difficulty of preventing terrorist acts and the 
civil liberties implications of intrusive surveillance—the alternative to 
stings—there should be a rebuttable presumption that anyone who 
provides material support to terrorism was predisposed to do so.”69 The 
basis for this recommendation is “that terrorism is such a heinous crime 
that it is unlikely the government could induce someone to support such 
criminals unless the person was one of the few predisposed to do so.”70 
Using this assumption to justify stacking the deck against criminal 
defendants charged with providing material support to terrorists is 
flawed for two reasons. First, the assumption of predisposition ignores 
the central debates at the heart of the material support ban, namely, those 
dealing with the criminalization of humanitarian aid and the overly 
broad construction of what constitutes material support. Second, this 
assumption does not take into account the inherently political nature of 
deciding which groups to designate as terrorists. 
In 1996, as part of the larger Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, Congress prohibited material support to certain designated 
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).71 The ban on providing material 
support to FTOs encompasses a fair range of activity72 and was intended 
                                                     
67. Id. at 146–48 (citations omitted). 
68. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice 
Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 113 (“The [entrapment] doctrine illustrates the pervasive 
limitations on the power of government to impose criminal sanctions—limitations that are 
supremely important.”). 
69. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 125. 
70. Id. 
71. For an extended discussion of this topic, see Wadie E. Said, The Material Support 
Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006) (“‘[M]aterial support or resources’ means any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
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initially to address the supposed problem of terrorist groups raising 
money under the guise of humanitarian activity.73 While courts and 
commentators have scrutinized and criticized the ban on providing 
material support to FTOs since its passage, the law serves as the main 
legal vehicle for prosecuting terrorist cases in federal court.74 A 
conviction under the law can carry with it up to fifteen years in prison, 
with a potential life sentence authorized if the material support can be 
connected to a specific act of violence that results in loss of life.75 
First, there has been a great deal of litigation on the constitutionality 
of banning material support to an FTO when a donor’s motivation was 
rooted in purely humanitarian purposes.76 The vast majority of courts 
considering the issue have ruled that providing support to an FTO in the 
knowledge that the group has been so listed, regardless of whether the 
support is intended for legal or illegal ends, is a sufficient standard to 
sustain a conviction.77 Whatever the merits of such a standard, it is easy 
to envision a situation where individuals can violate the ban on 
providing material support even when those same individuals lack any 
desire to further violence and instead legitimately intend to alleviate the 
suffering of others living in proximity to the FTO’s sphere of 
influence.78 If an informant tries to get someone to donate to an FTO on 
                                                     
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except 
medicine or religious materials.”). 
73. Said, supra note 71 (manuscript at 14) (on file with the author). 
74. Id. (manuscript at 13).  
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). 
76. Said, supra note 71 (manuscript at 33–49). Professor Stevenson notes that the material 
support laws have been controversial and the subject of academic criticism. He provides a citation 
to a few law review articles, but does not fully explore these issues. See Stevenson, supra note 35, at 
179 n.268. 
77. Said, supra note 71 (manuscript at 33–38) (discussing cases). 
78. During oral argument on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the ban on providing 
material support to a designated FTO, the district court judge in United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. 
Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2004), asked the prosecutor whether the judge’s elderly mother would be 
in violation of the law if she were to write a check to a known FTO but direct that the money go to 
an orphanage. The government noted that were she to do so with the knowledge that the group was 
an FTO, she would be breaking the law, regardless of her motives. Graham Brink, Charges in 
Terror Case Are Faulted, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at 1B. In the Guantanamo detainee 
litigation, the government also argued that the wide scope of material support laws could justify 
detaining individuals indefinitely as enemy combatants: 
[T]he Executive has the authority to detain the following individuals until the conclusion of the 
war on terrorism: “[a] little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a 
charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-Qaeda 
activities,” a person who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda member, and a journalist 
who knows the location of Osama Bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source.  
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a humanitarian basis by making an appeal to conscience, it is hard to see 
why predisposition should be presumed in such circumstances.79 
Solicitees are not likely to understand the wrongfulness of their conduct, 
given that a clever informant could make arguments about the valid need 
for aid, which could convince individuals otherwise not predisposed. 
Further, the material support ban is focused on groups, rather than on 
particular acts of violence. It is quite conceivable that individuals 
sympathetic to a group’s aims, but completely opposed to the use of 
violence, can be entrapped when material support is so broadly 
construed. This point is underscored by the Supreme Court’s recent 
opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,80 a civil suit involving 
individuals in the United States who wished to aid certain FTOs via 
peaceful means.81 At issue was the constitutionality of the terms 
“training,” “personnel,” “service,” and “expert advice or assistance,” all 
of which are impermissible forms of material support under the statute.82 
The Court ultimately ruled that the statute and all of the challenged 
terms were not unconstitutionally vague, nor did they violate the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech or association.83 
Therefore, individuals wishing to help an FTO advocate for its cause 
using peaceful means are providing illegal material support, even if their 
goal is to steer a group away from violence. The Court made clear that 
the ban applied to such speech-related activities, provided that they take 
place on behalf of the FTO itself; individual advocacy unconnected to 
the group remains protected.84 However, the Court’s position does not 
distinguish terrorism tactics from the aims of a group, which fallaciously 
                                                     
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitted).  
79. This dynamic was represented in United States v. al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2008), 
discussed in detail in Part II.B.7. 
80. 561 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
81. The Holder Court noted various peaceful activities advocated by the plaintiffs:   
(1) “train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to 
peacefully resolve disputes”; (2) “engag[ing] in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live 
in Turkey”; and (3) “teach[ing] PKK members how to petition various representative bodies 
such as the United Nations for relief.” . . . (1) “train[ing] members of [the] LTTE to present 
claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international bodies”; (2) “offer[ing] their legal 
expertise in negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government”; 
and (3) “engage[ing] in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.”  
Id. at 2716 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
82. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006). 
83. Holder, 561 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2722–31. 
84. Id. at 2726, 2730 (“In particular, we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent 
speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government were to show that such speech 
benefits foreign terrorist organizations.”). 
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conflates means and ends. It therefore remains possible for an informant 
to entrap someone to provide material support when the conduct being 
criminalized has no connection to terrorist activity, such as advising a 
group on how to petition the United Nations or United States Congress 
to recognize the plight of the people it claims to represent, or providing 
humanitarian aid for people in need. In such a scenario, not only is there 
no link to an act of violence, but the activity itself may be engineered to 
steer a group away from violence. Expecting someone unfamiliar with 
the complexities of material support litigation to make these distinctions, 
especially when confronted with an informant who is suggesting an 
incriminating course of action, is unrealistic at best. 
Second, Stevenson’s statement on the nature of terrorism does not 
allow for a discussion of any distinctions between groups, let alone an 
examination of a group’s motives, causes, or methods. Instead, his 
assumption that only someone so inclined would provide material 
support to an FTO sweeps too broadly against all those charged with 
violations of the material support ban. It ignores the inherently political 
nature of defining terrorism and how foreign policy concerns, as 
opposed to a principled commitment to even-handed legality, influence 
which groups are classified as FTOs.85 Central to a group being 
designated as an FTO is a determination that the group constitutes a 
threat to the security of U.S. nationals or U.S. national security—both 
expansively defined terms. Courts reviewing such designations have 
refused to look into the reasons behind the designation.86 By requesting 
aid for peaceful purposes, knowing full well that such aid violates the  
ban on providing material support, an informant could entrap an 
individual who may be sympathetic to an FTO’s aims but does not wish 
to support violence in any way. In so doing, the informant could 
highlight the perceived unfairness in designating the FTO as politically 
motivated, while at the same time stressing the non-violent nature of the 
proposed material support. 
The above discussion demonstrates the danger of making sweeping 
assumptions about the crime of material support without examining the 
permutations and implications of the law’s scope. While in the abstract it 
is clear that terrorism is a contemptible and illegal tactic, there are 
ethical and political reasons why someone might provide material 
support to an FTO and also reject violence. To presume prejudice when 
                                                     
85. See Said, supra note 71 (manuscript at 24–32). 
86. Id. (manuscript at 25). 
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an informant is part of the equation in inducing such support is going 
further than the law should allow. 
B. Attendant Assumptions: Who Is a Terrorist? 
Any entrapment discussion requires addressing the question of who is 
a terrorist according to popular and governmental perceptions in the 
United States. Currently, thirty-one of the forty-six designated FTOs are 
either Arab or Muslim, with the majority of that number being Islamist 
in ideology.87 The government identifies the greatest threat as terrorism 
committed by al-Qaeda and its related groups,88 although there are a 
significant number of non-al-Qaeda-affiliated Arab and Muslim groups 
of both religious and secular outlook.89 Additionally, of the four 
countries officially designated as “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” three 
are Arab or Muslim majority.90 Even assuming the validity of all these 
designations on political and normative grounds, the official numbers 
suggest that the archetypal terrorist comes from a certain background, 
particularly in light of the al-Qaeda network’s leading role as primary 
terrorist actor and threat. 
The construction of the terrorist as Arab or Muslim, as reflected in the 
composition of the various official terrorist lists maintained by the 
government, is borne out by other factors. Specifically, government 
action in the antiterrorism arena has resulted in a construct of the 
terrorist as irreducibly Muslim or “Muslim-looking.”91 This construct is 
                                                     
87. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (last visited Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/ 
123085.htm. 
88. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, The Terrorist 
Enemy, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (“Terrorist networks 
currently pose the greatest national security threat to the United States. The greatest threat and the 
most wanted terrorists come from the al-Qaida (AQ) network, which includes a core al-Qaida 
organization and numerous confederated extremist groups.”).  
89. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 87 (listing, for example, Hamas (Palestinian Islamist FTO), 
Hezbollah (Lebanese Islamist FTO), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(Palestinian Marxist FTO)). 
90. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, State 
Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (listing 
Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria). 
91. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2009) (“[There was] a racialized social construction of the terrorist that had 
already taken hold in the aftermath of September 11, and that has its antecedents well before. 
Immediately following the terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration deployed a set of racially 
directed immigration enforcement and detention practices which, coupled with thousands of 
incidents of hate violence—including nineteen murders—helped to consolidate the disparate 
identities of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians into a newly minted monolithic category in the 
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not new, nor is it limited to the period after 9/11. Just after the attacks on 
Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, the Nixon 
administration established a commission to examine the existence of 
terrorism in the United States.92 The commission ultimately came up 
with a set of policies, known as “Special Measures,” which resulted in 
increased restrictions on Arab immigration to the United States, as well 
as more stringent and invasive surveillance of Arab-Americans.93 Later 
historical events, such as the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, the first Gulf 
War of 1990–91, and the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, 
further cast Muslims and Arabs as the enemy.94 As early as 1986, the 
government was considering plans to use two military bases to detain 
Arab- and Iranian-Americans in the same vein as the Japanese 
internment of World War II.95 The post-9/11 immigration crackdowns 
on Arab and Muslim noncitizens96 were preceded by pre-9/11 selective 
immigration prosecutions against individuals based on their political 
beliefs,97 and the use of secret evidence to detain and deport.98 
                                                     
American racial lexicon: the ‘Muslim-looking’ person.”); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by 
Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1278 (2004) 
(“The logic of governmental profiling is only slightly more nuanced: (1) because all of the 
September 11 terrorists were Arab and Muslim; (2) because most Arabs are Muslims; and (3) 
because the terrorists claim religious motivation for their actions; (4) all Arabs and all Muslims are 
likely to be terrorists.”).  
92. JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY 121 
(2009); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Civil Rights Pre-September 11, 2001: The 
Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN PERIL: THE TARGETING OF ARABS AND 
MUSLIMS 18 (Elaine C. Hagopian ed., 2004). 
93. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 92, at 121; Akram, supra note 92, at 18. 
94. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 92, at 122; Akram, supra note 92, at 18; see also Michael J. 
Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2849–52 (2001).  
95. YVONNE YAZBECK HADDAD, NOT QUITE AMERICAN? THE SHAPING OF ARAB AND MUSLIM 
IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2004). 
96. Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-
9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a 
Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 624–31 (2005); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on 
Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (June 2003), 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/ (documenting violations of Muslim and Arab immigrants’ 
civil rights while detained by the authorities in the wake of 9/11).  
97. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (holding that 
immigrants cannot assert a selective-enforcement claim in the immigration context).  
98. Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological 
Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999) (detailing cases and the practice of using secret evidence 
against Arab and Muslim noncitizens suspected of involvement with terrorist groups). 
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Ultimately, Arab- and Muslim-Americans became presumptive 
terrorists, as detailed by Professors Susan Akram and Kevin Johnson: 
Since at least the 1970s, US laws and policies have been 
founded on the assumption that Arab and Muslim noncitizens 
are potential terrorists and have targeted this group for special 
treatment under the law. This post-September 11 targeting of 
Muslims and Arabs is simply the latest chapter in this history.99 
Stated another way, well before 9/11, as noted by Professor Natsu 
Taylor Saito, “Arab Americans and Muslims have been ‘raced’ as 
‘terrorists’: foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening.”100 The 
rendering of Arab- and Muslim-Americans as presumptive terrorists for 
the purposes of official policy has been mirrored by longstanding 
portrayals of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists in the news media and 
Hollywood.101 
This state of affairs also has helped shape popular perceptions of 
Arabs and Muslims as terrorists. Where popular support for racial 
profiling in law enforcement operations had plummeted in the period 
prior to 9/11, a public opinion poll taken shortly after 9/11 indicated that 
a majority of Americans approved of racial profiling against Arabs and 
Muslims in terrorism investigations.102 According to Professor John 
Tehranian, “Middle Eastern Americans . . . now suffer from more 
systemic racism than ever before, a fact that makes them unique among 
America’s ethnic and racial groups.”103 To illustrate his point, he points 
to the example of the uproar in 2006 over the proposed transfer of 
                                                     
99. Akram & Johnson, supra note 92, at 10. 
100. Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” 
of Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 12 (2001); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The End 
of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1481, 1488–89 (2002). But see Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1575–76 (stating that the racialization of Arab- and Muslim-Americans occurred as a 
result of 9/11). 
101. See generally JACK G. SHAHEEN, GUILTY: HOLLYWOOD’S VERDICT ON ARABS AFTER 9/11 
(2008); JACK G. SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A PEOPLE (2001); 
EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERMINE HOW WE 
SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD (1997). 
102. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 92, at 124 (noting additionally that African-American support 
for the use of racial profiling was significantly higher than that of whites, even though members of 
that particular ethnic group were disproportionately victimized by the tactic). It bears noting that 
racial profiling has been disavowed and disapproved as a tactic for federal law enforcement officers 
in traditional law enforcement activities, but may be used in national security investigations “to the 
extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIV., Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies (June 
2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance_on_race.php. 
103. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 92, at 119.  
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control over operations at several American ports to DP World, an entity 
owned by the government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).104 
Despite the Bush administration’s support for the deal, overwhelming 
popular and bi-partisan opposition to the transfer of control led to the 
deal being scuttled, despite the fact that the UAE is a major ally of the 
United States in the Middle East.105 Ultimately the incident revealed an 
ominous development: 
Foreign companies and contractors have long managed 
operations of American ports—in fact, DP World’s immediate 
predecessor was a foreign entity. The issue was plainly not one 
of foreign control—a practice that had gone unnoticed until the 
specter of Arab-run port operations arose. The port incident 
highlighted the way that rampant racism had caused Americans 
to harbor such misgivings about Middle Easterners, though not 
any other group of individuals, from having some control over 
our infrastructure. Sadly, the incident seemed to suggest that one 
of the few things both the populist left and right can agree on is 
their distaste for Arabs and people from the Middle East.106 
This sentiment has now transformed and grown into a fear and 
distrust of an entire faith, as evidenced by the current upheaval over the 
proposed construction of a mosque near the site of the former World 
Trade Center in New York,107 the fact that a large number of Americans 
suspect that President Obama is in fact a Muslim,108 a Florida minister’s 
now-suspended plan to burn the Quran publicly,109 and Oklahoma voters 
passing a state constitutional amendment prohibiting state courts from 
considering Islamic law (the Shari’ah) or international law in rendering 
decisions.110 
C. Law Enforcement’s Cultivation and Utilization of Informants 
The preceding discussion on the racialization of Arabs and Muslims 
as terrorists influences the government’s use of informants in the 
                                                     
104. Id. at 119–20. 
105. Id. at 120. 
106. Id. 
107. Paul Vitello, Furor on Islamic Center Exposes Mixed Feelings of Local Muslims, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at A1. 
108. Helene Cooper, Obama Tries to Calm Tensions in Call for Religious Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 2010, at A1. 
109. Id. 
110. James C. McKinley, Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
15, 2010, at A12. 
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investigatory phase of a prosecution and the government’s methods of 
cultivating informants. A review of the guidelines governing the FBI’s 
use of informants, as well as the tactics the agency employs to cultivate 
informants, is instructive. 
1. FBI Guidelines 
The latest guidelines on FBI domestic operations, issued by then-
Attorney General Michael Mukasey in late September 2008, permit the 
agency to open “assessments,” meaning potentially probing surveillance 
and investigations on a target, “without any particular factual 
predication.”111 The techniques that the FBI uses in conducting its 
assessments have not been disclosed to the public, despite Freedom of 
Information Act inquiries for such information by public interest 
groups.112 
More specifically, the FBI’s use of informants is governed by the 
Attorney General’s Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Undercover Operations (Guidelines), the latest version of which was 
issued in 2002 by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft.113 The 
Guidelines are very influential, not simply for the FBI and its 
investigations, but also for other federal agencies and state and local law 
enforcement.114 The Guidelines assign enforcement of their terms to an 
internal administrative body, but otherwise disclaim responsibility for 
any violations by FBI agents.115 Federal courts have not upheld an 
entrapment defense rooted in violations of the Guidelines.116 The 
Guidelines do have a subsection on entrapment, which includes language 
that tracks the subjective test accurately.117 In addition to the warning on 
                                                     
111. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC 
OPERATIONS (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf. 
112. See, e.g., David L. Sobel, Prompted by EFF Lawsuit, FBI (Partially) Releases Domestic 
Surveillance Guidelines, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2009/09/prompted-eff-lawsuit-fbi-partially-releases-domest (commenting on FBI’s 
release of requested report with almost all relevant sections redacted). 
113. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (May 30, 2002) [hereinafter FBI GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbiundercover.pdf. 
114. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 163.  
115. FBI GUIDELINES, supra note 113, para. VII (“These Guidelines are set forth solely for the 
purpose of internal DOJ guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to 
create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any matter, civil or 
criminal, nor do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative 
prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”). 
116. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 164 n.191 (citing examples). 
117. FBI GUIDELINES, supra note 113, para. V.A. (“Entrapment must be scrupulously avoided. 
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the legal standard for entrapment, there are a series of preconditions that 
must be met before an undercover operation can be authorized, and the 
focus of these conditions is on the critical element of a target’s 
predisposition, or lack thereof.118 The Guidelines make clear that FBI 
personnel are bound by the contours of the entrapment defense, but the 
Guidelines do not purport to modify the defense itself.119 
2. FBI Tactics 
When coupled with the perception that Arabs and Muslims are 
suspect, the standards governing the FBI’s use of informants and broad 
authority to conduct assessments have led to controversial results and 
trends. Most emblematic of this recent dynamic is the tactic of sending 
informants to mosques in the United States to report on possible terrorist 
activity without any articulable suspicion or probable cause.120 
Revelations about informants secretly taping conversations at a Los 
Angeles-area mosque in 2006 and 2007 led FBI Director Robert Mueller 
to defend the tactic, despite the controversy and potential chill of 
religious freedom the reports engendered.121 Specific to the issue of 
entrapment, the tactic created the impression that the FBI’s real goal was 
                                                     
Entrapment occurs when the Government implants in the mind of a person who is not otherwise 
disposed to commit the offense the disposition to commit the offense and then induces the 
commission of that offense in order to prosecute.”). 
118. Id. at para. V.B. The Guidelines focus on establishing a series of preconditions before 
engaging in an undercover operation, with specific mention of a subject’s predisposition as a 
prerequisite: 
[N]o undercover activity involving an inducement to an individual to engage in crime shall be 
authorized unless the approving official is satisfied that— 
(1) The illegal nature of the activity is reasonably clear to potential subjects; and  
(2) The nature of any inducement offered is justifiable in view of the character of the illegal 
transaction in which the individual is invited to engage; and 
(3) There is a reasonable expectation that offering the inducement will reveal illegal activity; 
and  
(4) One of the two following limitations is met: 
(i) There is reasonable indication that the subject is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to 
engage in the illegal activity proposed or in similar illegal conduct; or  
(ii) The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so that there is reason to believe 
that any persons drawn to the opportunity, or brought to it, are predisposed to engage in the 
contemplated illegal conduct.). 
119. Stevenson, supra note 35, at 166. 
120. Teresa Watanabe & Paloma Esquivel, L.A. Area Muslims Say FBI Surveillance Has a 
Chilling Effect on Their Free Speech and Religious Practices, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/local/me-muslim1. 
121. See Michael R. Blood, FBI Director Defends Use of Informants in Mosques, MSNBC.COM, 
June 8, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31177049/. 
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not to seriously evaluate threats, but to “entrap and incite” Muslim-
Americans.122 
Some have criticized sending informants to mosques as a lazy law-
enforcement tactic, because “it’s much more difficult to catch real 
terrorists than it is to catch mosque-goers.”123  It is hard to imagine, 
however, that houses of worship could become targets of investigation 
without any cause or suspicion whatsoever, if the ethnic or religious 
group in question was not so vilified or readily identified with a threat to 
national security. 
Further, the underhanded tactic of spying on worshippers at mosques 
is only part of a strategy to produce information that creates great 
discord within the Muslim community. Recent press reports detail the 
FBI’s attempts to convince noncitizens, including Muslim religious 
leaders, to become informants.124 In cases where the individuals refuse 
the FBI’s invitation, the agency increases the pressure by seeking to 
deport them, in the hopes that the threat of being forcibly removed from 
the United States will cause them to change their minds.125 Manipulating 
vulnerability to induce an individual to become an informant is a tried-
and-true tactic widely used by law enforcement in the domestic law 
enforcement sphere.126 
The case of Foad Farahi, an imam of Iranian origin at a Florida 
mosque, illustrates this trend.127 In 2004, FBI agents approached him and 
requested that he work as an informant for the agency.128 Farahi agreed 
to help the FBI by providing information about the local Muslim 
community and translating documents on the condition that his 
                                                     
122. Id.  
123. Coleen Rowley, Letter to the Editor, Fear, Terror, and the Mosques, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 
2009, at A28 (criticizing the practice as lacking “factual justification”). Rowley is a former FBI 
agent turned whistleblower who criticized the FBI’s handling of the pre-9/11 investigation of the 
suspected “20th hijacker” Zacarias Moussaoui. Id.; Coleen Rowley’s Memo to FBI Director Robert 
Mueller, TIME, June 3, 2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/ 
memo.html. 
124. See Trevor Aaronson, FBI Tries to Deport Muslim Man for Refusing to Be an Informant, 
MIAMI NEW TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2009-10-08/news/unholy-war-
fbi-tries-to-deport-north-miami-beach-imam-foad-farahi-for-refusing-to-be-an-informant/; Paul 
Vitello & Kirk Semple, Muslims Say F.B.I. Tactics Sow Anger and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2009, at A1 (noting case of Brooklyn cleric who sued the government after the FBI allegedly 
threatened to derail his green card application were he not to spy on relatives abroad). 
125. See Aaronson, supra note 124. 
126. See NATAPOFF, SNITCHING, supra note 4, at 40 (“Indeed, part of the process of creating 
informants involves the purposeful manipulation of their vulnerability.”). 
127. See Aaronson, supra note 124. 
128. Id. 
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cooperation with the government be made public.129 When the agency 
asked that he operate as a secret informant and investigate specific 
targets, he refused, even though the agents offered to grant him legal 
residency in the United States (he had been in the United States on a 
student visa) and to pay him for his services.130 While nothing came of 
this initial exchange, an FBI agent renewed the agency’s request that 
Farahi become an informant in 2007, and again he refused.131 Several 
months later, the government claimed it had evidence of his involvement 
in terrorist activities.132 Farahi claims he was given an ultimatum: either 
drop his application for political asylum in the United States and leave 
the country or be charged as a terrorist.133 After agreeing to leave the 
country voluntarily, Farahi changed his mind and sought to reinstate his 
political asylum claim once he realized the government fabricated 
terrorism links to pressure him to become an informant.134 Farahi’s is 
one of several reported cases of individuals who refused to become 
informants for the FBI in national security investigations and suffered 
either criminal or immigration prosecution as a result.135 
The entrapment defense is notoriously vague, but it is perhaps the 
only tool available to defendants tarred by the terrorism brush. When 
one considers the stigmatizing effect of the label attached to Arabs and 
Muslims as presumed terrorists, separating predisposition from 
entrapment becomes ever more difficult, and limits the effectiveness of 
the already weakened entrapment defense. Indeed, since September 11, 
2001, it appears that there is not one recorded instance of a successful 
entrapment defense in a terrorism trial.136 
                                                     
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. See REPORT CARD 2010, supra note 2, at 20 (“As of September 2010, the entrapment 
defense has never been used successfully in a post-9/11 federal terrorism trial.”). 
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III. INFORMANT USE IN TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 
A. History of Use in the Pre-9/11 Terrorism Prosecution 
1. Before the First World Trade Center Bombing in 1993 
The concept of a terrorism prosecution involving what has come to be 
called international terrorism has not developed until relatively recently. 
As a result, there are not many examples of terrorism prosecutions in the 
period before the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, 
let alone the documented use of informants in such prosecutions. Two 
early cases involving allegations of international terrorism and featuring 
informants were tried to juries in federal court in Brooklyn in 1982–
83.137 Both cases involved several individuals of Irish descent charged 
with supplying the Provisional Irish Republican Army with weapons for 
its fight against British security forces in Northern Ireland.138 In both 
cases, the defendants claimed entrapment by a government informant; 
the informants in each case said they were employed by the Central 
Intelligence Agency and thus were officially vested with the authority to 
deliver the weapons to Ireland, effectively legalizing the weapons 
distribution.139 In the first case, the jury credited the defendants’ 
contention that the agent had entrapped them,140 and acquitted all five 
defendants despite the evidence and hostile stance taken by at least one 
defendant.141 In the second case, four defendants were convicted and 
sentenced to terms ranging from two to seven years in prison,142 
penalties that seem incredibly light for activities directly connected to 
violence, especially when compared to typical penalties imposed in 
connection with the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism. Perhaps 
even more incredible than the light sentences was the fact that the men 
                                                     
137. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); Robert D. McFadden, Five Are 
Acquitted in Brooklyn in Plot to Run Guns to I.R.A., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1982, at L31. 
138. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 65; McFadden, supra note 137, at L31 (noting weapons allegedly 
smuggled were “a 20-millimeter cannon, a flame thrower, 47 machine guns, and 11 automatic 
rifles”).  
139. McFadden, supra note 137; Duggan, 743 F.2d at 68–69, 84–85. 
140. McFadden, supra note 137.  
141. Joyce Wadler, Unbowed, and Unashamed of His I.R.A Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at 
B2 (“This is the legend of Mr. Harrison. At his 1982 trial on weapons charges, when the prosecutor 
asserts that he has been running guns for six months, Mr. Harrison, in a grand heroic stance, orders 
his lawyer to set the record straight. ‘Mr. Harrison is insulted,’ his lawyer says. ‘He wants the court 
to know that there has not been a weapon sent to Northern Ireland in the last 25 years without Mr. 
Harrison.’”). 
142. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 64 n.2. 
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were convicted at all, given the result of the first trial and a federal jury’s 
willingness to recognize an entrapment defense in such circumstances. 
2. The First World Trade Center Bombing and Beyond 
The first World Trade Center bombing and the plot to blow up 
landmarks around New York City underscored the difficulty in using an 
informant, a difficulty that is inherent in any wide-ranging and complex 
multi-defendant conspiracy. In the wake of the first World Trade Center 
bombing in February 1993, it came to light that the FBI had been using 
an informant, a former Egyptian army officer by the name of Emad 
Salem, who had managed to penetrate the conspiracy.143 The agency 
claimed to have dropped Salem as an informant after his refusal to wear 
a body recorder, but re-hired him after the attack.144 Unknown to the 
FBI, Salem had made secret recordings of his telephone calls with FBI 
agents,145 and in one exchange implied that he had given the agency 
information on the bomb used in the plot, but the FBI failed to intervene 
and thwart the attack.146 In continuing his work for the FBI after the 
blast, Salem managed to infiltrate a large-scale conspiracy to blow up 
several landmarks in the New York City area, headed by the leader of 
the Egyptian Islamic Group (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya), Sheikh Omar 
Abdel Rahman, for whom he worked as a bodyguard.147 While Salem 
ultimately testified at length in the landmarks case,148 which resulted in 
convictions of the various defendants on charges of seditious 
conspiracy,149 his relationship with the government was strained, and the 
defense aggressively pursued an entrapment defense based on his 
conduct.150 Though the record in the case also included information 
                                                     
143. Ralph Blumenthal, Tapes in Bombing Plot Show Informer and F.B.I. at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 27, 1993, at A1.   
144. Id. 
145. Ralph Blumenthal, Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb Used in Trade Center Blast, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at A1. 
146. Richard Bernstein with Ralph Blumenthal, Bomb Informer’s Tapes Give Rare Glimpse of 
F.B.I. Dealings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at L44. 
147. Id. 
148. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 106 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Salem was one of the 
Government’s key witnesses at trial. The Government acknowledges that Salem is a braggart who 
often told tall tales of his past. However, by 1993 Salem was regularly tape recording his 
conversations with the group members and those tapes served to corroborate much of his testimony 
at trial.”). 
149. Id. at 103.  
150. Id. at 131, 142; Joseph P. Fried, Muslim Cleric Was Framed by Top Informer, Defense Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1995, at B3; Joseph P. Fried, Defense Challenges F.B.I. over Bomb Plot 
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about his contacts with Egyptian military intelligence, it appeared that 
his cooperation with the FBI was entirely unrelated to his past work in 
the Egyptian army.151 
Emad Salem was a particularly difficult witness, admitting on the 
stand to lying repeatedly, which fueled defense counsel’s efforts to argue 
that their clients had been entrapped by a clever provocateur.152 
However, despite the highly inchoate nature of the crimes that were the 
object of the landmarks conspiracy, Salem’s testimony allowed the 
government to obtain convictions in what can retrospectively be termed 
a preventive prosecution. What role the defendants’ racial, ideological, 
and religious beliefs played in crediting his testimony, which was 
ostensibly undermined by his fabrications and questionable behavior, is 
anyone’s guess. 
The use of informants in the period between the first World Trade 
Center bombing and 9/11 did not yield a large number of prosecutions 
generated by informants, which is understandable, given the relative 
novelty of the criminal terrorist prosecution.153 When a terrorist 
prosecution did feature an informant’s tip, it was typically not part of the 
government’s strategy to have an informant infiltrate a given plot. The 
case of Lafi Khalil and Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer,154 two Palestinians of 
Jordanian nationality,155 is illustrative. Their roommate, an Egyptian 
named Abdelrahman Mossabah, approached the police in Brooklyn to 
                                                     
Informer, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at B5. The defendants also unsuccessfully attempted to argue 
that they were the victims of “[g]overnment [o]verinvolvement,” essentially an outrageous-
government-conduct charge. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 131. 
151. United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236, 268–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
152. James C. McKinley, Jr., Key Witness in Bomb-Plot Trial Admits Lying About His Exploits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A1. 
153. The star witness in the prosecution of the individuals responsible for the August 1998 
bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was a former al-Qaeda operative who 
approached an unnamed U.S. embassy abroad and essentially defected. See United States v. Bin 
Laden, 397 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of 
U.S. Embassies in East Afr., 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008); LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING 
TOWER 5 (2006). It is difficult to describe this witness as an informant under the definition adhered 
to in this Article, given that he did intend to aid his terrorist coconspirators. However, he does not 
exactly fit the definition of a cooperator—someone who “conspired with terrorists at one point but 
[was] induced to cooperate with law enforcement,” REPORT CARD 2009, supra note 1, at 43—
because his motivation in approaching the government was rooted in his theft of over $100,000 of 
Bin Laden’s money. WRIGHT, supra at 5. Clearly, the government did not induce him to cooperate, 
as he turned himself over at a U.S. consulate abroad. Id.  However, he later pleaded guilty to felony 
conspiracy charges in 1997, entered witness protection, and had not been sentenced as of 2005. Id. 
154. United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000). 
155. John Kifner, Arrested Men Often Seen, Little Known in Park Slope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 
1997, at B4. 
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pass on that the two men had a cache of pipe bombs they intended to 
detonate on the New York City subway.156 Mossabah provided the 
police with a diagram of the apartment’s interior and a key to the front 
door, which facilitated Khalil and Abu Mezer’s capture and arrest.157 
While ultimately Khalil was convicted only of possessing a fraudulent 
green card and sentenced to thirty-six months in prison, Abu Mezer was 
given two life sentences plus thirty years as a result of his being 
convicted on charges of possessing and threatening to use a weapon of 
mass destruction.158 Moassabah’s actions were fortuitous and represent 
the most straightforward manner in which informing for the police can 
protect society’s larger interests in safety and security. 
B. Post-9/11 and the Preventive Focus 
The period after 9/11 has witnessed the government’s efforts to 
engage in so-called preventive prosecution of terrorists—arrests and 
prosecutions that occur before any dangerous plot can come to 
fruition.159 Preventive prosecution contrasts with terrorist prosecutions 
pre-9/11, which focused mainly on punishing those individuals 
implicated in cases involving violent attacks that had already 
occurred.160 The cases discussed below highlight, in rough chronological 
order, the preventive focus of the post-9/11 terrorism prosecution but 
also evidence the central role informants have played in bringing 
charges, often in questionable circumstances. Despite the questionable 
circumstances, all the prosecutions below resulted in convictions against 
the charged defendants, their respective claims of entrapment 
notwithstanding. 
1. United States v. Siraj 
In May 2006, a twenty-four-year-old Pakistani immigrant named 
Shahawar Matin Siraj was convicted on several conspiracy counts 
stemming from an alleged 2003 plot to blow up the 34th Street subway 
station in New York City.161 The chief witnesses against him at trial 
                                                     
156. Khalil, 214 F.3d at 115; Kifner, supra note 155. 
157. Khalil, 214 F.3d at 115. 
158. Id. 
159. DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 26–28, 102 (2007); Robert M. 
Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Threat of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 430 (2006). 
160. Chesney, supra note 159. 
161. United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 
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were his co-conspirator, a nineteen-year-old schizophrenic who by then 
was cooperating with the government; an undercover police officer who 
had many encounters with Siraj; a confidential informant; and the 
informant’s police handler.162 Siraj’s entrapment defense was the main 
issue of legal significance litigated during the trial, based in large part on 
what his lawyer characterized as the informant’s repeated efforts to push 
him to plan and carry out the bombing plot.163 The informant, Osama 
Eldawoody, a fifty-one-year-old Egyptian immigrant, had been recruited 
by the New York City Police Department to work as an informant in the 
wake of 9/11.164 Over the course of his tenure as an informant, 
Eldawoody attended 575 prayer services at New York mosques, 
sometimes as many as four to five times a day, and also wrote down 
license plate numbers of various congregants.165 Evidently, police 
surveillance of mosques in New York City was a key part of its strategy 
for investigating terrorist activity.166 
At trial, it emerged that Eldawoody, who reported he found Siraj to be 
“impressionable,” suggested the method to create the bomb, 
recommended they use the Russian mafia to obtain nuclear material, and 
invented a fictitious organization—“the Brotherhood”—that he claimed 
would supply the explosives necessary to carry out the plan.167 Siraj 
argued that Eldawoody constantly talked to him about the war in Iraq, 
the Abu Ghraib scandal, and the American government’s treatment of 
Muslims to inflame his passions, but the court allowed the testimony of 
the undercover police officer to rebut these arguments.168 Specifically, 
Siraj’s attempt to establish that he had been entrapped by Eldawoody 
                                                     
2008); Robin Shulman, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage?, WASH. POST, May 
29, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/28/AR200705280 
1401.html. 
162. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 415; Shulman, supra note 161. 
163. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 414.  
164. Shulman, supra note 161. 
165. Id. 
166. William K. Rashbaum, Window Opens on City Tactics Among Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, May 
28, 2006, at A29. 
167. Shulman, supra note 161. The evidence was subject to various interpretations, as the 
following section shows: 
The very beginning started when he asked me if I could design a nuclear bomb,” Eldawoody 
says in an interview. “I told him yes.” But Martin R. Stolar, Siraj’s lawyer, referring in court to 
police notes from Dec. 23, 2003, suggested that Siraj had simply asked why Eldawoody didn’t 
work as a nuclear engineer—and Eldawoody told Siraj that he was capable of creating a dirty 
bomb.  
Id.  
168. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
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hinged on the construction of his predisposition to carry out the bombing 
attack.169 He tried to argue Eldawoody goaded him into the plan by 
seeking to incite him and that he had always been a nonviolent person.170 
In rebuttal to Siraj’s entrapment defense, the undercover officer testified 
about Siraj’s praise of Osama Bin Laden and support for further 
bombings in the United States.171 Further, the trial saw the admission of 
evidence of Siraj’s support for al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hamas leaders, 
violence against Jews, and books and videos endorsing and praising so-
called violent jihad, which bolstered the government’s predisposition 
argument.172 
On the issue of political opinions and religious belief being elicited to 
show predisposition, the court had this to say: 
Defendant also argues that allowing the undercover officer’s 
testimony raises “considerable First Amendment concerns” by 
criminalizing legitimate political discourse. However, even if 
the undercover officer testified to statements made by defendant 
that may be described as reflecting defendant’s political views, 
those statements were properly admitted as discussed above. 
That defendant’s statements contain political expression does 
not insulate defendant from their use at trial where the 
statements also rebut his testimony and prove predisposition.173 
Of course, this statement makes perfect sense if one tends to equate 
certain beliefs and sentiments, however objectionable, with a propensity 
to engage in dangerous and violent activity. Certainly the New York 
City Police Department thought so because it was actively investigating 
terror without an apparent articulable suspicion, but focused instead on 
mosque surveillance. The court and jury agreed that Siraj was 
predisposed to committing the crimes with which he was charged, 
                                                     
169. Id. at 414. 
170. Id. at 419. Naturally, this type of claim is not unusual in cases involving informants and 
arises in terrorism prosecutions as well. See United States v. El-Hindi, 2009 WL 1373268 (N.D. 
Ohio May 15, 2009); United States v. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2008); United States 
v. Mazloum, 2007 WL 2778731 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2007). The three cited decisions stem from a 
single prosecution of three individuals convicted of conspiring to provide material support to 
terrorists on the basis of their alleged plot to receive training from a government informant, a former 
Special Forces officer, to fight American forces in the Middle East. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 671 
(“The defendants claimed that the informant dominated the discussion and frequently raised the 
topic of fighting American troops abroad.”). 
171. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 419. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the government’s 
failure to turn over reports of the undercover officer detailing statements Siraj made to him was not 
prejudicial. United States v. Siraj, 533 F.3d 99, 100–02 (2d Cir. 2008). 
172. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 422–23. 
173. Id. at 420. 
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thereby viewing his words as evidence of his intention to carry out the 
bombing. Notwithstanding Eldawoody’s role in the case, the verdict, 
which was upheld by the Second Circuit,174 also suggests something 
about the powerful effect evidence of support for Bin Laden and al-
Qaeda can have against a Muslim defendant in a terrorist case. After all, 
when Eldawoody asked Siraj to plant the bomb at the subway station, he 
balked, saying that he would need his mother’s permission to do so; at 
trial, she testified that he never asked her the question.175 Ultimately, 
Siraj’s prosecution raised, but in retrospect did not conclusively answer, 
the question of whether he was being punished for his protected speech 
and political views as much as for his actual intent to cause harm. 
2. United States v. Hayat 
In April 2006, Hamid Hayat, a Pakistani-American, was convicted by 
a jury in the Eastern District of California of three counts of making 
false statements to FBI agents and one count of providing material 
support to terrorists, based on his alleged attendance at a terrorist 
training camp in Pakistan and subsequent denials that he did so.176 A 
large part of the government’s case was built on the testimony of its 
confidential informant, Naseem Khan, codenamed “Wildcat,” who 
befriended Hayat and frequently referenced politically and religiously 
charged topics.177 Khan, who had earlier mistakenly identified al-Qaeda 
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri as having visited the California mosque 
Hayat frequented, managed to elicit from Hayat statements calling al-
Qaeda “tough” and praising the murder of former Wall Street Journal 
reporter Daniel Pearl.178 His attempts to encourage Hayat to attend a 
terrorist training camp were rebuffed, albeit in a manner that 
demonstrated Hayat’s sympathy for the cause.179 Despite Khan’s 
                                                     
174. United States v. Siraj, slip op., No. 07-0224-CR, 2008 WL 2675826, at *1 (2d Cir. July 9, 
2008).  
175. Shulman, supra note 161, at C2.  
176. United States v. Hayat, 2007 WL 1454280, at *1, 11 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2007). 
177. Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 
I16. Apparently, Khan was initially engaged in investigating the activities of two imams working at 
the mosque Hayat attended in Lodi, California. However, rather than actively engaging in terrorist 
activity, the worst thing the imams did was make anti-American statements. The two imams were 
ultimately deported from the United States without ever being charged with a crime. Id.  
178. Id. (“They killed him. So I’m pleased about that. They cut him into pieces and sent him 
back. That was a good job they did. Now they can’t send one Jewish person to Pakistan.”). 
179. Id. (“I’m ready, I swear. My father tells me, ‘Man, what a better task than this.’ But when 
does my mother permit it? Where is a mother’s heart? She said, ‘I kept you separated for 10 years. I 
won’t let you be separated from me again.’”). 
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extensive direct testimony regarding his conversations with Hayat about 
extremist groups, the court curtailed defense counsel’s ability to cross 
examine him on these topics, as well as whether Hayat told him he had 
been lying about attending a camp.180 For his efforts as an informant, 
Khan received over $225,000 from the FBI.181 
In addition to Khan’s testimony, Hayat’s recorded confession to the 
FBI that he attended a training camp and his possession of a religious 
supplication were the critical pieces of evidence in securing his 
conviction. But the confession, delivered in broken English as a result of 
a series of leading questions, was far from clear-cut.182 In fact, the FBI’s 
interrogation was so deficient that one former veteran agent volunteered 
to testify for the defense, although the court disallowed the testimony.183 
In other words, the prosecution of Hamid Hayat can be seen as the 
racialization of a young Muslim-American as a terrorist based on 
evidence of his political views and religious beliefs. As for the 
supplication, the jury heard testimony from the government’s expert 
witness that a supplication Hayat carried on his person was evidence of 
                                                     
180. Hayat, 2007 WL 1454280, at *13–14. 
181. Id. 
182. Arax, supra note 177. In relevant part, Hayat’s confession was as follows: 
“So jihad means that you fight and you assault something?” 
“Uh-huh.” 
“Give me an example of a target. A building?” 
“I’ll say no buildings. I’ll say people.” 
“OK, people. Yeah. Fair enough. People in buildings . . . I’m trying to get details about plans 
over here.” 
“They didn’t give us no plans.” 
“Did they give you money?” 
“No money.” 
“Guns?” 
“No.” 
“Targets in the U.S?” the agent asked again. 
“You mean like buildings?” 
“Yeah, buildings,” the agent nodded. “Sacramento or San Francisco?” 
“I’ll say Los Angeles and San Francisco.” 
“Financial, commercial?” 
“I’ll say finance and things like that.” 
“Hospitals?” the agent suggested. 
“Maybe, I’m sure.” 
“Who ran the camp?” 
“Maybe my grandfather.” 
“Al Qaeda? Al Qaeda runs?” 
“I’ll say they run the camp. . . . Yeah, that’s what I’ll say.” 
183. Hayat, 2007 WL 1454280, at *13–14, 19–24.  
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his being engaged in violent jihad against the enemies of Islam.184 Even 
the translation that the government offered was controversial and 
disputed by the defense, because it was used as evidence of Hayat’s 
propensity to engage in religiously motivated violence against the 
United States.185 Although the jury heard testimony that carrying a 
supplication was a common practice in Pakistani culture engaged in 
mainly by individuals seeking protection while traveling, the court 
precluded the defense expert from testifying that what was in Hayat’s 
pocket was such a supplication.186 As one commentator argued, “the 
prosecution’s focus on—and narrow interpretation of—a prayer known 
to and used by millions of Muslims seemed to border on criminalizing a 
religious practice.”187 
3. United States v. Lakhani 
Hemant Lakhani, a British citizen of Indian descent, was convicted of 
multiple counts stemming from his role, as an arms trader, in trying to 
obtain shoulder-fired missiles for a terrorist group.188 The government 
had engaged a professional Pakistani informant named Muhammed 
Habib Ur Rehman, who had earned some $400,000 over nineteen years 
in this capacity, to approach Lakhani about purchasing the missiles.189 In 
upholding Lakhani’s convictions and forty-seven-year prison sentence, 
the Third Circuit remarked that the facts of the case represented a 
tedious “22-month odyssey spanning oceans and continents,”190 which 
one foreign witness described as “incomprehensible.”191 Apparently, 
Rehman was referred to Lakhani by Abdul Qayyum, whom the court 
described as “a suspected terrorist now living in Dubai, U.A.E. . . . 
believed to have been involved in a series of 1993 bombings in India 
known as the ‘Mumbai blasts.’”192 Rehman secretly recorded his 
                                                     
184. Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2006), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2006/10/prophetic-justice/5234/. 
185. Id.; Hayat, 2007 WL 1454280, at *17–19.  
186. Hayat, 2007 WL 1454280, at *17–19; Waldman, supra note 184, at 90. 
187. Waldman, supra note 184 (“No wonder many Muslims (and non-Muslims) I spoke to argued 
that the upshot of these cases was to redefine for one class of Americans what constitutes 
permissible speech, association, or belief—to ask Muslims to prove their Americanness by denying 
their texts, history, and religion.”). 
188. United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2007). 
189. Id. at 174–75.  
190. Id. at 175. 
191. Id. at 175 n.4. 
192. Id. at 175. 
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conversations with Lakhani, in which he made clear his intention to use 
the missiles against civilian U.S. targets—a sentiment Lakhani seemed 
to appreciate.193 Even though the government previously stopped using 
Rehman as an informant, deeming him “untrustworthy,”194 the jury 
apparently credited his testimony,195 given that Lakhani secured the 
purchase of a missile and delivered it to Rehman in the United States.196 
Lakhani’s entrapment and related due process defenses failed because 
his statements over a lengthy period indicated his predisposition to 
commit the crime; he was an arms dealer, among other professions, and 
seemed to have no qualms about engaging in the transaction despite its 
potential to bring serious harm to civilians.197 What is notable about 
Lakhani’s prosecution is that his links to terrorism, to the extent they 
existed, were not ideological but financial in nature. While there is no 
mention of the Indian-born Lakhani’s religious background in the Third 
Circuit’s opinion, Hemant Lakhani is not a Muslim name, and his lawyer 
argued at trial that his client had no sympathy for Islamic 
fundamentalists.198 Although the court noted his links to an individual 
implicated in the 1993 Mumbai bomb attacks, in fact those bombings, 
however horrible and destructive they may have been, were the work of 
Indian organized crime gangs operating in the city, not Islamic 
fundamentalists.199 Abdul Qayyum, the “terrorist” who was finally 
deported to India from the United Arab Emirates in 2007 to face 
criminal charges for his role in the bombings, was actually known in 
India as a “gangster” with longstanding ties to the most notorious figures 
in the Mumbai underworld.200 Lakhani’s prosecution and conviction 
represent a case where the government used an informant to target an 
arms dealer who would transact with terrorists, regardless of motivation. 
Although the informant’s persistence may have induced the transaction, 
Lakhani was likely predisposed to commit the type of crime for which 
                                                     
193. Id. at 175, 175 n.6. 
194. Id. at 174. 
195. Id. at 174 n.2. 
196. Id. at 176–77 (noting that American and Russian law enforcement agencies worked together 
to deliver a missile that functioned electronically, but was not armed with a warhead). 
197. Id. at 177. 
198. Robert Hanley, Jury Hears 2 Views of Man Accused in Missile Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 
2005, at B5.  
199. See MISHA GLENNY, MCMAFIA: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE GLOBAL CRIMINAL 
UNDERWORLD 123–24 (2009). 
200. 1993 Blasts: Charges Against Abdul Qayyum, ONEINDIA (Mar. 3, 2008), 
http://news.oneindia.in/2008/03/03/charges-framed-against-93-blast-accused-abdul-qayyum-
1204551510.html.  
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he was charged.201 However, his prosecution demonstrates the extent—
perhaps necessary, perhaps not—to which the government will make use 
of an informant to target terrorist activity. 
4. The Fort Dix Prosecution 
In December 2008, five young Muslim residents of southern New 
Jersey were convicted of conspiring to attack the United States Army 
base at Fort Dix; four of the defendants were given life sentences and the 
fifth was sentenced to thirty-three years in prison.202 The investigation 
into the alleged plot was triggered by a clerk at a local Circuit City store 
reporting to the authorities that he had been asked to digitally transfer a 
videotape containing footage of the defendants shooting firearms in the 
woods while shouting in Arabic.203 The government responded by hiring 
informants to investigate the matter.204 The centerpiece of the 
government’s case against the men—three ethnic Albanian brothers, a 
naturalized citizen of Jordanian origin, and a Turk—was hundreds of 
hours of conversations the men engaged in with the two government 
informants.205 Of the twenty-three days of trial, seventeen were taken up 
with the informants’ testimony.206 The key issue in the case was whether 
the defendants actually intended to attack the base or merely engaged in 
harmless talk without intending to act.207 The prosecution also 
                                                     
201. In this respect, Lakhani’s case is remarkably similar to the government’s prosecution of 
Monzer Al Kassar, a Spanish arms dealer of Syrian origin who was most probably entrapped into 
agreeing to sell weapons to U.S. agents posing as representatives of the FARC, a Colombian FTO. 
See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Trafficker, NEW YORKER, Feb. 8, 2010, at 42 (“Rather than try 
Kassar for a crime he’d committed in the past, they would use the strong conspiracy laws in the 
United States to prosecute him for something that he intended to do in the future. They would 
infiltrate Kassar’s organization and set him up in a sting. Many European countries have ‘agent 
provocateur’ laws to guard against entrapment, but in an American court it would be difficult for a 
trafficker with Kassar’s history to protest that he was in no way predisposed to clandestine weapons 
deals.”); see also United States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
202. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Shnewer, No. 07-459 (RBK) (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 
2008); Troy Graham, Convicted Fort Dix Plotters Are Innocent, Family Members Say, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, May 3, 2009, at B1; 5th Plotter in Fort Dix Case Gets 33-Year Term, THE TIMES 
(Trenton, N.J.), Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.nj.com/south/index.ssf/2009/04/5th_fort_dix_plotter_ 
gets_33ye.html; see also United States v. Abdullahu, 488 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D.N.J. 2007). 
203. Kevin Coyne, Informer Appears at Trial, but His Recordings Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2008, at NJ1.  
204. Id. 
205. See John P. Martin, Unknown to Each Other, 2 Spies Worked Fort Dix Case, STAR LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Dec. 7, 2008, at 17.  
206. Id. 
207. See John P. Martin, Terror or Talk? Fort Dix Jury Hears Closing Arguments, THE TIMES 
(Trenton, N.J.), Dec. 16, 2008, at A09. 
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introduced evidence showing that the defendants had repeatedly watched 
al-Qaeda videos and downloaded lectures that spoke in favor of Islamist 
violence, in addition to their firing weapons in the woods on several 
occasions.208 
The main informant, an Egyptian named Mahmoud Omar, testified at 
length regarding the conversations he had taped with the defendants.209 It 
emerged that Omar’s tactics in insinuating himself into the alleged plot 
were aggressive; at one point, he urged one of the defendants to go 
ahead with the plan to attack the base.210 One defendant reacted to 
Omar’s request for a map of Fort Dix by contacting the police to warn 
them of his suspicions.211 Another defendant told Omar that jihad would 
have to wait, because he had to go get a haircut.212 These and other 
interactions prompted Omar to vent his frustration with the defendants, 
telling one that “You talk but you don’t do nothing.”213 
Omar’s background was also highly suspect. He entered the United 
States illegally, was subsequently convicted of bank fraud, and then 
served time in prison.214 While being investigated for his role in another 
fraud case, the FBI asked him to work as an informant, and he 
apparently tried to escape to Canada.215 Instead, he was caught and then 
agreed to work for the FBI.216 In exchange for his services, Omar was 
paid over $240,000, not including rent and assorted expenses, and given 
relief from his legal troubles.217 The government’s other informant, an 
Albanian named Besnik Bakalli, agreed to work in that capacity after 
facing deportation from the United States.218 He also had a criminal 
                                                     
208. See id. 
209. Martin, supra note 205. 
210. Allison Steele, Dix Terror Informant Says He Urged Attack Plan, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 
13, 2008, at B1. 
211. Geoff Mulvihill, Jury in Fort Dix Trial Still Undecided, THE TIMES (Trenton, N.J.), Dec. 21, 
2008, at B01. 
212. George Anastasia, Haircut Trumped Jihad, Fort Dix Witness Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 
14, 2008, at B01. 
213. David Porter, Fort Dix Suspect All Talk, Little Action, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 14, 2008.  
214. Martin, supra note 205. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id.; George Anastasia, Emotional Families Question Fort Dix Verdicts, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Dec. 23, 2008, at A01 (noting Bakalli’s earning $15,000 for his work on the case).  
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record in Albania, where he was convicted on a weapons charge after 
shooting a man who had threatened his sister.219 
The Fort Dix defendants were apprehended before they came at all 
close to carrying out the alleged plot, so it certainly can be viewed as a 
successful preventive prosecution. However, given the informants’ 
backgrounds, motivations, and compensation, the families of the 
defendants were justified in contesting the jury verdict because there was 
no real movement toward carrying out the alleged attack. Further, any 
attempts to argue that the defendants were entrapped were offset by 
extrinsic evidence of the defendants’ religious beliefs and political 
positions, rendering the possibility of a more serious predisposition 
analysis fruitless.220 The government’s use of these types of otherwise 
protected statements as evidence of an intent to carry out acts of 
terrorism, when coupled with an informant’s machinations, are seen as 
particularly controversial.221 The Fort Dix case is indicative of this trend 
and raises the issues most starkly of (1) whether the defendants would 
have really done anything but for the informants’ actions and (2) the 
limits of the entrapment defense when a jury is presented with evidence 
of anti-American views expressed from an Islamist perspective. 
                                                     
219. Id. (noting that the two informants were unaware of each other’s role as a government agent, 
and that they actively disliked each other). 
220. See Did Informant’s Actions Aid Fort Dix Plotters?, MSNBC.COM, May 10, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18601345/ns/us_news-security (“‘In the post-9/11 era, the 
entrapment defense is basically useless,’ Klingeman said. ‘For a defendant, merely saying he wishes 
he could do harm to America, the jury has heard enough.’”). 
221. See The War and Peace Report: Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid 
Informants Raises Questions about Validity of Terrorism Cases (Democracy Now! television 
broadcast Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.democracynow.org/2010/10/6/entrapment_ 
or_foiling_terror_fbis_reliance (quoting Karen Greenberg, Executive Director of Center on Law and 
Security, New York University School of Law: “When you’re dealing with informants, you’re 
dealing with people who have been convicted of or threatened with conviction or found in the act of 
some kind of criminality. And there is everything in their interest to make sure that they do what the 
FBI wants,” which involves “preying upon people’s vulnerabilities.”); Daphne Eviatar, Terrorism 
Cases Hinge on Paid Informants, WASH. INDEP., Dec. 19, 2008, http:// 
washingtonindependent.com/22674/terrorism-cases-hinge-on-paid-informants (“‘The government 
has used an extraordinary amount of resources to find people who have an antipathy to US policies 
as it relates to the Middle East and see which ones can get motivated, or angry enough, to follow the 
leadership of a confidential informant,’ says Sam Schmidt, a lawyer who represented one of the men 
accused in the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Africa. ‘Many of these cases appear to be the 
informant who is either working off a case to avoid going to jail or being deported or is seeking 
remuneration, approaching some people and getting them excited, getting them angry and 
persuading them to join in what has been described as terrorism conspiracies.’”). 
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5. Seas of David Prosecution 
In May 2009, after two mistrials, five of the seven defendants in the 
prosecution known as the “Seas of David” case were convicted in 
federal court in Miami for providing material support to terrorists in an 
alleged plot to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago and the FBI building 
in Miami.222 The government alleged that the men were members of a 
radical Islamic group called the Moorland Organization, which sought 
al-Qaeda’s help in arranging to blow up their targets.223 The case began 
when an FBI informant of Yemeni extraction tipped off the authorities 
that he had met an individual who articulated his desire to create an 
Islamic state in America.224 This tip led the FBI to send in another 
informant, Elie Assad, a Lebanese man with a dubious history of being 
denied entry in Mexico, Syria, and Yemen, to gauge the defendants’ 
intentions.225 Posing as an al-Qaeda financier, Assad asked Narseal 
Batiste, the alleged leader of the group, what he needed to make his plot 
operational.226 Curiously, the list included expensive equipment and 
$50,000 cash, but no explosives—surprising for an alleged conspiracy to 
blow up large buildings.227 At Assad’s urging, the group conducted a 
reconnaissance mission of the FBI building in Miami.228 When members 
of the group started to doubt Assad and withdraw from the plot, Assad 
conceived of a plan to swear them into al-Qaeda, orchestrating a 
swearing-in ceremony that the FBI observed in its entirety.229 
Ultimately, in a plot that the FBI deputy director called “more 
aspirational than operational,”230 the informants were paid more than 
                                                     
222. Damien Cave & Carmen Gentile, Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears Tower, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 12, 2009, at A19. 
223. United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373-CR, 2007 WL 2412837, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 
2007). Interestingly, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), “America’s largest Islamic 
civil liberties group,” issued a statement shortly after the indictment was announced calling on the 
media not to refer to the defendants as Muslims due to the radical and unorthodox nature of their 
beliefs. Mohammad Sabry, US Terror Suspects Not Muslims: CAIR, ISLAMONLINE.NET (June 24, 
2006), http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2006-06/24/02.shtml.  
224. Eric Umansky, Department of Pre-Crime, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2008, 1:00 AM), 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/02/department-pre-crime (noting that the informant, Abbas al-
Saidi, had been bailed out by the FBI in a case in which he had assaulted his girlfriend). 
225. Carol J. Williams, A Case of Terror or Entrapment?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at A15. 
226. Umansky, supra note 224. 
227. See id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. John O’Neil, Terror Plot Was in ‘Earliest Stages,’ Gonzales Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/us/22cnd-indict.html. 
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$120,000 for their assistance, and Assad was granted political asylum in 
the United States.231 
The facts underlying the Seas of David prosecution were undisputed, 
but the defendants tried to argue that they were desperate for money and 
saw an opportunity to potentially scam Assad out of $50,000.232 Defense 
counsel questioned the government’s need to fabricate a crime when so 
many real criminal acts went uninvestigated or unpunished.233 Perhaps 
the most remarkable aspect of the whole case was the government’s 
insistence on repeat prosecution of the defendants despite two earlier 
mistrials.234 This fact speaks to the powerful impact the terrorist 
imprimatur can have on a case, in that it can allow the government to 
insist on victory, even if the threat being thwarted was of its own making 
and therefore not necessarily a threat to national security. 
6. Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain 
Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain were convicted of multiple 
counts of terrorism-related crimes stemming from their role in 
laundering $50,000 connected to a fictitious plot to attack a Pakistani 
diplomat in New York.235 Aref was an Iraqi Kurdish refugee and imam 
at an Albany, New York mosque, and Hossain was a naturalized U.S. 
citizen of Bangladeshi origin and proprietor of a pizzeria in the Albany 
area.236 The plot was the product of an FBI informant named Shahed 
Hussain, codenamed Malik, a Pakistani resident of the Albany area who 
ingratiated himself with Hossain before discussing the transaction.237 
When Malik became an informant, he was facing criminal fraud charges 
                                                     
231. Umansky, supra note 224. 
232. Id. (noting Batiste’s statement while being secretly recorded: “I’m exhausted financially. We 
have nothing.”). 
233. Williams, supra note 225. 
234. Cave & Gentile, supra note 222. Additionally, the government moved to deport Lyglenson 
Lemorin, a Haitian national and longtime United States legal permanent resident who was acquitted 
after the first Seas of David trial, mere days after the jury’s verdict on essentially the same charges 
that failed in the criminal prosecution. See Jay Weaver, Florida Defendants Face ‘Double 
Jeopardy’ in Immigration Court, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 31, 2009, at 4B. He was ordered deported 
by an immigration judge and is currently appealing the order.  See Joel Millman, Haitian Found Not 
Guilty of Terrorism Is Not Free, Either, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010, at A4. 
235. United States v. Aref, No. 04-CR-402, 2007 WL 603508, at *2–4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007), 
aff’d, 285 F. App’x 784 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding conviction and denying motion for a new trial); 
Michael Wilson, Jury Convicts 2 Albany Men in Missile Sting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at B1. 
236. Aref, 2007 WL 603508, at *2–4; Wilson, supra note 235, at B1. 
237. Graham Rayman, The Alarming Record of the F.B.I.’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot, 
VILLAGE VOICE (July 8, 2009), http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-
record-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-bomb-plot/. 
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for taking DMV written tests on behalf of other immigrants for a fee; he 
had recently declared bankruptcy; and a fire destroyed an uninsured 
building he owned.238 Malik began cooperating with the FBI after the 
government agreed to drop criminal charges and not to deport him.239 
Malik initially approached Hossain at his pizzeria, bringing gifts for 
the owner’s children and eventually divulging the details of the plot.240 
He would help Hossain, who was experiencing financial difficulties, 
renovate his pizzeria with a $50,000 loan.241 He later told Hossain that 
he received the money for his efforts in procuring a surface-to-air 
missile for a terrorist group as part of its plan to shoot down the plane of 
a Pakistani diplomat.242 Hossain was to pay back the loan in small 
increments, effectively laundering the proceeds of the sale for Malik and 
the terrorist group.243 Although Aref had come to the attention of law 
enforcement because his name was found among papers of suspected 
terrorists in Iraq and he was associated with the leader of a Kurdish 
Islamic terrorist group, he was brought into the scheme only when 
Hossain asked him to be a witness to the transaction with Malik, per 
Islamic custom.244 
In addition to the familiar claim that the defendants would not have 
even contemplated the crime but for the informant, there was a more 
troubling aspect to the investigation and prosecution. Specifically, 
throughout the investigation, Malik misrepresented the nature and 
content of his conversations with the defendants, a fact that was borne 
out when the FBI’s reports of those conversations were compared to the 
actual transcripts.245 On one occasion, the FBI report from Malik stated 
that Hossain supported the plan to bring the missile to the United States 
                                                     
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Wilson, supra note 235. 
241. Id. 
242. Rayman, supra note 237. 
243. Id.; Wilson, supra note 235. 
244. Rayman, supra note 237; Wilson, supra note 235. 
245. Rayman, supra note 237 (“But in each case, the question remains: Would either set of 
defendants have done anything remotely like plant bombs or launder money for terrorists if not for 
the prodding and plotting and encouragement of Malik and the FBI? And there’s a more troubling 
question: When Malik tells his FBI handlers that the defendants are saying menacing things about 
America, is he actually telling the whole truth? Translations from the Albany case transcripts 
suggest that Malik routinely exaggerated and, in some cases, wholly fabricated the words of the 
defendants. When they talked about Islam being a religion of peace and of jihad being a way of 
inspiring fealty to Islam, Malik instead told his handlers that they had talked about Islam inspiring 
them to kill. Those exaggerated reports became the basis for the FBI’s case against Hossain and 
Aref, who were both convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison.”). 
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and that, were it not for his family, Hossain would be taking up arms in 
the fight.246 The transcript actually recorded Hossain as saying: “I don’t 
believe in your method—that’s why I don’t take that path.”247 Malik’s 
duplicity was exacerbated by the fact that the conversations were in 
broken English and vague to the point of raising the issue of whether 
Aref and Hossain understood what was going on.248 
 
7. The New York Synagogue Plot 
 
The prosecutions of Aref and Hossain were not the only high-profile 
prosecutions in which Malik served as an informant breaking up an 
alleged terrorism plot. In June 2009, local police and the FBI arrested 
four men in Newburgh, New York on suspicion of plotting to blow up a 
Bronx synagogue and community church in an al-Qaeda-inspired plot by 
so-called “home-grown terrorists.”249 Far from being careful and 
thorough planners, the defendants were small-time crooks with extensive 
criminal records; one of the defendants “was arrested in a crack house 
surrounded by bottles of his own urine; his lawyer describes him as 
‘mildly retarded.’”250 As for the plot, Malik had been approaching young 
men at a Newburgh mosque with gifts and offers of jobs, and ended up 
meeting James Cromitie.251 After telling Cromitie that he was a 
representative of a Pakistani terrorist organization with ties to al-Qaeda, 
he directed Cromitie in recruiting three other men to engage in the 
plot.252 Lawyers for the defendants moved unsuccessfully to have the 
indictment dismissed on the grounds that Malik, who used aggressive 
and provocative tactics to keep Cromitie interested in the plot, 
essentially entrapped them, with promises that their participation could 
yield them up to $250,000.253 The charges against the men were 
                                                     
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Petra Bartosiewicz, Experts in Terror, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2008, at 18. 
249. See Indictment at 2, United States v. Cromitie, No. 09-CR-558 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009); 
Rayman, supra note 237.  
250. Rayman, supra note 237. 
251. A.G. Sulzberger, Defense Cites Entrapment in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at 
A22. 
252. Id. 
253. United States v. Cromitie, 2010 WL 3025670, at *1, 4, 9 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2010); 
Sulzberger, supra note 251 (“‘But for government’s money and supplies and Hussain’s 
indefatigable efforts, there is not the slightest chance that the crimes charged would or even could 
have occurred,’ Susanne Brody, a federal defender, wrote in one of two filings in United States 
District Court.”). 
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announced with great fanfare at a news conference by New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly.254 After a lengthy trial, the jury convicted the defendants of all 
charges, rejecting their contention that they had been entrapped by the 
government’s informant.255 The use of Malik in this case was perhaps 
even more surprising than in the prosecutions of Aref and Hossain, given 
that it demonstrates that not only was the government not initially 
troubled by Malik’s actions, it was actually willing to use him again in a 
similar capacity, no matter how tenuous the plot may have been.256 
These cases highlight the fact that law enforcement does not merely 
allow a paid informant to troll houses of worship looking for recruits by 
promising them money, but seems to overtly approve of such activity. 
8. United States v. Al-Moayad: A Cautionary Tale 
The prosecution of the Yemeni sheikh Mohammed al-Moayad and his 
personal assistant Mohammed Zayed represents the rare instance where 
defendants charged with terrorist crimes in a prosecution driven by an 
informant managed to obtain relief from a federal court of appeals. Its 
details are revealing. In November 2001, a Yemeni named Mohammed 
al-Anssi approached the FBI and offered, in exchange for money and 
immigration status for his family in Yemen, to aid the agency in 
investigating a number of individuals he claimed were involved in 
terrorism.257 Al-Anssi claimed to have known al-Moayad from their days 
in Yemen as neighbors, and asserted that the sheikh had told him in the 
mid-1990s of being involved in financing and supporting terrorist 
activities.258 
Based on this proffer, the government sent al-Anssi on three trips to 
Yemen to investigate al-Moayad’s activities.259 During the second trip, 
al-Anssi claimed that the sheikh had given him information on his 
relationship with Osama Bin Laden, and the third trip included attending 
                                                     
254. See Rayman, supra note 237. 
255. Kareem Fahim, 4 Convicted of Attempting to Blow Up 2 Synagogues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2010, at A21.  
256. Cf. Sulzberger, supra note 251. At trial, Malik testified that he entered the United States on a 
forged British passport, and ultimately received asylum here as a result of his being subjected to 
torture in Pakistan on the basis of “politically motivated” charges against him, which included 
murder. Kareem Fahim, Informant Says Defendant Wanted to Be a Martyr, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2010, at A17. 
257. United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). 
258. Id. 
   259. Id.  
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a wedding presided over by the sheikh at which a leader of the FTO 
Hamas praised a recent suicide bombing carried out by that group on the 
very same day.260 The fruit of these trips, during which al-Anssi took 
notes on his interactions with al-Moayad, was an elaborate sting 
operation in which the sheikh and Zayed were lured to Germany for a 
meeting that was to be secretly observed and videotaped.261 Al-Anssi 
and another informant repeatedly insisted on having al-Moayad help 
them with funding violent jihad and referred to the legitimate charities 
that the sheikh ran as being codes for other things.262 Video surveillance 
of al-Moayad and Zayed revealed that when the two were alone, they 
expressed reservations about working with the informants, and 
disavowed any knowledge of an impending terrorist attack, which al-
Anssi’s partner had asked about.263 
Afterwards al-Moayad and Zayed were arrested and transferred to the 
United States to face charges of providing and conspiring to provide 
material support to FTOs in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Prior to 
their trial date, however, al-Anssi set himself on fire in front of the 
White House to protest what he perceived as the FBI’s poor treatment of 
him.264 Apparently, he felt that the $100,000 he received for his work as 
an informant was insufficient and attempted to extort more out of the 
FBI by setting himself on fire.265 In addition to al-Moayad’s prosecution, 
al-Anssi played a central role in some twenty terrorism prosecutions, at 
times leaving bitterness in his wake after being revealed as an 
informant.266 The government chose not to call al-Anssi to testify against 
al-Moayad and Zayed, who in turn called him to testify as part of their 
effort to establish an entrapment defense.267 Defense counsel brought out 
the fact that al-Anssi was experiencing financial difficulties, and had 
recently been convicted of felony bank fraud.268 
                                                     
260. Id. at 147. 
261. Id. at 148. 
262. Id. at 149. 
263. Id. at 150. 
264. Id. at 146. 
265. Id. 
266. William Glaberson, Behind Scenes, Informer’s Path Led U.S. to 20 Terror Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at B1.  
267. See Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 153–55. 
268. Id. at 154. Al-Anssi received five years’ probation after pleading guilty, even though he 
continued to write bad checks while working for the FBI on al-Moayad’s case. See William 
Glaberson, FBI Informer Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at B2. 
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Critically, however, after the sheikh’s lawyer pressed al-Anssi to 
admit that he did not have any documentary or audiovisual evidence 
linking his client to violent jihad prior to the sting operation in Germany, 
the government successfully moved to introduce al-Anssi’s notes of his 
meetings with al-Moayad in Yemen as rebuttal evidence.269 These notes 
purported to show al-Moayad’s role in sending young men to engage in 
violent jihad in several conflict-ridden zones, as well as facilitating 
millions of dollars in funding to Osama Bin Laden and Hamas, 
respectively.270 The district court also allowed the government to 
introduce a videotape of the speech by the Hamas official praising the 
suicide bombing; previously, the court refused to admit it due to its 
prejudicial nature.271 Earlier in the trial, the court had permitted 
extensive testimony by a survivor of the actual attack; a defense attempt 
to have the court instruct the jury that neither defendant had anything to 
do with the attack was denied.272 
The government was given wide latitude by the district court to rebut 
the entrapment argument. Without stating any reasoning for its ruling, 
the district court allowed, over defense objection, the introduction of a 
form signed by an “Abu Jihad” purporting to be an application to train at 
an al-Qaeda military camp in Afghanistan to which he claimed that he 
was recommended by al-Moayad.273 The government introduced the 
testimony of a Yemeni-American who had pleaded guilty to attending 
such a training camp.274 However, the scope of his testimony far 
exceeded what the government had proffered and he testified extensively 
as to his experience of undergoing military training at the camp and 
being addressed there by Bin Laden.275 Finally, the court allowed the 
government to introduce documents seized by Croatian intelligence that 
allegedly showed a connection between two mujahideen fighters from 
Yemen headed to Afghanistan and the sheikh, because his name was in 
their address books.276 
Even though the jury convicted the defendants on the material support 
conspiracy charges, and the district court imposed a sentence of seventy-
five years on al-Moayad and forty-five for Zayed, the Second Circuit 
                                                     
269. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 154–55. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 147, 155. 
272. Id. at 147, 152–53. 
273. Id. at 156. 
274. Id. at 156–57. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 157. 
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reversed the convictions.277 In stating its reasoning, the court of appeals 
found specifically that: 
The district court’s cumulated errors in admitting Al-Anssi’s 
notes and the testimony of Gideon Black and Yahya Goba ‘cast 
such a serious doubt on the fairness of the trial’ as to warrant 
reversal of the defendants’ convictions. That doubt is especially 
grave when we also take into account the district court’s 
erroneous admission of the mujahidin form, the wedding video, 
and the Croatian last will and testament . . . .278 
Although the subjective entrapment defense was not successful at trial, 
the prosecution of al-Moayad and Zayed was the rare one in which the 
court of appeals decreed that the government went too far given the 
government’s inflammatory tactics. Ultimately, the case was resolved 
when al-Moayad and Zayed pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide 
material support to Hamas, were sentenced to time served (six years), 
and were ordered deported to Yemen.279 
IV. CREATING THE TERRORIST ACCORDING TO A 
CONSTRUCT 
The above cases share certain characteristics—an informant engaging 
in provocative behavior that leads to the arguable commission of a 
terrorism-related crime. There is a genuine question as to whether the 
defendants would have committed those crimes but for the informants’ 
actions. None of the post-9/11 examples involve pre-existing 
conspiracies to engage in violent behavior, but rather a collection of 
individuals who exhibited varying degrees of willingness to go along 
with plans suggested by an informant. When the main legal mechanism 
available to defendants combating terrorism charges is the entrapment 
defense, it is inevitable that the predisposition analysis delves into 
matters of an individual’s political and religious beliefs. If, based on an 
individual’s religious or ethnic background, society is predisposed to 
view the individual as a terrorist, then the entrapment defense is no 
defense at all. The cases cited above bear witness to that fact, as no 
defendant was acquitted on the basis of entrapment. 
                                                     
277. Id. at 145, 178–79. 
278. Id. at 178–79 (instructing also that the case be remanded to a different district judge). 
279. See Spencer S. Hsu, Cleric Convicted of Terrorism-Financing Charge to be Deported, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/ 
07/AR2009080703415.html; Ash-Shaykh al-Muayyad ya’udu ila Sana’ (Sheikh al-Moayad Returns 
to Sana’a), ALJAZEERA ONLINE, available at http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ 
818696E4-3795-4375-8CA2-0CB3C838F512.htm. 
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Informant use in terrorism prosecutions must be placed in its proper 
context. That context is one in which the government has allocated 
tremendous resources to combat terrorism, but terrorism of the al-Qaeda 
or anti-American variety occurs relatively infrequently, especially on 
U.S. soil.280 Based on resource allocation alone, under a preventive 
model of combating terrorism, the FBI is under considerable pressure to 
deliver tangible results.281 This is an unsustainable model; attendant 
pressures might see FBI agents use informants to construct a plot where 
none might have existed. This dynamic can serve to ensnare unfairly 
those of a certain ethnic or religious background, particularly in light of 
the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims abroad—and 
presumably American Muslims as well—have a decidedly negative view 
of al-Qaeda.282 
When an informant plays a central role in advancing a plot—leaving 
entrapment as the only viable line of defense—the above cases 
demonstrate how otherwise protected speech serves as evidence of 
predisposition. For example, the jury was permitted to hear about Hamid 
Hayat’s highly inflammatory remarks in praise of the murder of former 
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.283 The Fort Dix, Lakhani, and 
Siraj prosecutions all featured admission of remarks by the defendants 
praising al-Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks in some way.284 In the 
Aref/Hossain prosecution, even opinions expressing doubt that Muslims 
were responsible for 9/11 were admitted against the defendants.285 While 
there are no doubt legitimate uses for this type of evidence, which may 
                                                     
280. Cf. Petra Bartosiewicz, The Intelligence Factory: How America Makes its Enemies 
Disappear, HARPER’S, Nov. 2009, at 42–43. (“Because this war, by definition, has no physical or 
temporal boundaries, the demand for such intelligence has no limit. But the world contains a 
relatively small number of terrorists and an even smaller number of terrorist plots. Our demand for 
intelligence far outstrips the supply of prisoners.”). 
281. See id.  
282. A recent poll “found that support for Al Qaeda-conceived attacks against American civilians 
in the U.S. homeland, such as the attack attempted aboard Flight 253, is virtually negligible in a 
diverse array of heavily populated Muslim-majority countries.” Steve Coll, House Testimony: The 
Paradoxes of Al Qaeda, NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/01/house-testimony-the-paradoxes-of-al-qaeda.html#entry-more. 
Another poll suggested “that citizens of Islamic countries, as elsewhere, overwhelmingly disapprove 
of all indiscriminate violence against civilians, no matter who carries it out, and no matter what the 
cause—attitudes that encompass strong disapproval of Al Qaeda’s tactics and indiscriminate aerial 
bombardment by U.S. forces alike.” Id.  
283. Sherman, supra note 63, at 1505. 
284. See Sherman, supra note 63, at 1495 (Lakhani); id. at 1505 (Siraj); Graham, supra note 202 
(Fort Dix defendants). 
285. Rayman, supra note 237, at 7 (acknowledging Aref’s claim that of 14 million Saudis, only 
about 400 follow Bin Laden). 
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have been properly admitted in the cases analyzed above, it must be 
noted that for many Americans such opinions can easily color their view 
of a defendant as a terrorist, given the likelihood that they might already 
disproportionally associate Arabs or Muslims with being terrorists. 
There is thus no real possibility of highlighting the positive aspects of a 
defendant’s character to mitigate the general perception that society 
identifies these defendants as terrorists. In other words, unlike the 
defendants in Sorrells286 and Jacobson,287 both of whom had served in 
the United States armed forces, the above mentioned terrorism 
defendants are of foreign origin; both their presence here and their 
religion are suspect. There is little that they could do to disprove their 
already suspect status the way a native-born veteran, farmer, or former 
soldier could, even before any negative statements had been admitted 
against them. 
The government’s use of informants reflects a debate within the FBI 
about the benefits of cooperating with, as opposed to spying on, the 
American Muslim community.288 That significant sections of the 
nation’s main law enforcement agency responsible for prosecuting 
terrorism in U.S. courts view an entire community, encompassing many 
nationalities and ethnic groups, as irredeemably loyal to the nebulous 
concept of “terrorism” at the expense of their loyalty to the United 
States, is factually incorrect289 and speaks volumes about how difficult it 
is for a terrorism suspect to disprove predisposition to commit a crime. 
Viewing Arab- and Muslim-Americans as presumptively disloyal, at a 
time when the United States is embroiled in two wars in Muslim-
                                                     
286. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (noting that “defendant had no previous 
disposition to commit it, but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured 
defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solicitation in which he 
succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as 
companions in arms in the World War”). 
287. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 542, 543 (1992) (noting defendant was “a 56-year-
old veteran-turned-farmer who supported his elderly father in Nebraska”).  
288. See Vitello & Semple, supra note 124 (“[There are] differing views within the bureau about 
the effectiveness of community outreach, said Michael Rolince, a former director of 
counterterrorism in the F.B.I.’s Washington field office. Some factions within the agency, he said, 
have always been leery of Islamic and Arab-American organizations, considering their loyalties to 
be divided. ‘There are some people in the bureau who believe, as I do, that the relationship with the 
Muslim community is crucial and must be developed with consistency,’ Mr. Rolince said. ‘And 
there are those who don’t.’”). 
289. Tom Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study 
of Muslim Americans, LAW & SOC’Y REV. 24 (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559923 (finding that ninety-six percent of 
Muslim Americans surveyed agreed with the statement “I am proud to be an American” and ninety-
seven percent agreed with the statement “What America stands for is important for me”). 
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majority countries, enhances the perception in the Muslim world that the 
war on terrorism is a war on Islam.290 
All of the above analysis underscores the ineffectiveness of the 
entrapment defense in its current guise in a terrorism case involving an 
informant. Some scholars advocate that courts should apply the objective 
test in cases involving informant-driven stings.291 In a recent article 
analyzing several of the prosecutions discussed here, Jon Sherman 
makes a series of sensible recommendations on how to reform the 
entrapment defense.292 He first proposes to alter the definition of 
entrapment to require the government to demonstrate that the defendant 
initiated the contact with the informant. Sherman goes on to argue that 
some acts should be complete bars to prosecution: constant government 
persuasion to commit the felony over the defendant’s hesitance; 
misrepresenting the illegality of the conduct; the only connection to the 
jihadist organization being the informant’s cover story; and government 
incitement of religious fervor.293 He argues that evidence of a 
defendant’s political and religious views should be allowed only when it 
is probative of the defendant actually committing the crime in 
question.294 He concludes with a series of policy arguments supporting 
his recommendations, which essentially state that informant use is 
inefficient, of dubious constitutionality, and risks alienating the Muslim 
community, whose assistance is crucial to investigating terrorism in the 
United States.295 
Unfortunately, important segments of the Muslim community in the 
United States feel alienated already and their future cooperation with the 
FBI is in jeopardy.296 Not only is the FBI not scaling back its use of 
                                                     
290. However, recent press reports indicate that President Obama is aware of the perception that 
the United States’ war on terrorism is perceived as a war on Islam and is making efforts to change 
that perception. See Matt Apuzzo, Obama Talks Less of Terror in Outreach to Muslims, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2011541571_apusterrorismr 
hetoric.html?syndication=rs. 
291. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Guantanamo by Other Means: Conspiracy Prosecutions and Law 
Enforcement Dilemmas After September 11, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 513, 556 (2008) (arguing for the 
adoption of the objective standard in terrorism conspiracy prosecutions).  
292. Sherman, supra note 63, at 1499–510. 
293. Id. at 1500, 1502–04. 
294. See id. at 1506. 
295. See id. at 1508–10 (adding that Sherman’s recommendations would be more protective of a 
defendant’s First Amendment rights).  
296. See Matthew Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377, 399 n.107 (2009); Gil Ronen & Maayana 
Miskin, U.S. Muslim Coalitions Warn They Will Boycott F.B.I., ISRAELNATIONALNEWS.COM, (Mar. 
24, 2009) http://www.israelnationalnews.com/SendMail.aspx?print=print&type=0&item=130596.  
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informants, as the prosecution of those individuals charged with plotting 
to blow up New York-area synagogues reveals,297 the agency continues 
to make use of informants rather liberally.298 Arab- and Muslim-
Americans are already subject to a kind of racial profiling that has been 
rejected elsewhere, and the gaps in how the FBI and the community 
understand terrorism are quite wide.299 Nowhere was this difference in 
perception more stark than in the al-Moayad case, prior to the Second 
Circuit’s opinion reversing the convictions. The sheikh’s lead prosecutor 
wrote an op-ed in the New York Times touting the prosecution as a 
vindication of the government’s preventive approach and the 
effectiveness of trying terrorists in federal court.300 At sentencing, the 
sheikh, hobbled with Hepatitis B and C, asthma, diabetes, and high 
blood pressure, and incredulous as to his fate, was left muttering “Your 
honor, what have I done?”301 
Perhaps the main difficulty with trying to reform the entrapment 
defense to curtail informant excesses is that many informant-driven 
prosecutions reflect entrenched institutional and societal prejudices. The 
time has almost certainly come to call for not merely a curative or more 
objective version of entrapment doctrine, but rather a halt to the policy 
of using informants to investigate terrorism-related cases where no 
articulable suspicion exists. That is not to say that informants cannot 
play a role in helping create that legally required suspicion, but rather 
that it is both dangerous and unjust to allow them to play the same role 
as an undercover officer302 without providing genuine oversight by 
agents who have some understanding of the language, culture, and 
motivations of the community from which a suspect originates. None of 
                                                     
297. See supra Part III.B.6. 
298. See FBI – Chicago, Chicago Man Arrested in Attempted Bombing Plot, September 20, 2010, 
available at http://chicago.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel10/cg092010.htm (discussing allegations against 
Sami Samir Hassoun, a Lebanese citizen charged with plotting to plant a bomb in Chicago); 
Michael Tarm, Sami Samir Hassoun, Chicago Terror Suspect, Could Claim Entrapment, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/22/sami-samir-
hassoun-chicag_n_734639.html (remarking on the role played by a confidential informant, who 
worked for over a year with the defendant before he agreed to the plot). 
299. See Juan Cole, The FBI’s Plan to “Profile” Muslims, SALON.COM (July 10, 2008), 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2008/07/10/muslim_profiling. 
300. See Kelly Anne Moore, Editorial, Take Al-Qaeda to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at 
A19. 
301. Robert F. Worth, Yemeni Cleric Is Sentenced to 75 Years in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 29, 2005, at B3. 
302. This is not to say that undercover policing is without its own problems. See Elizabeth E. Joh, 
Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155 
(2009). 
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the prosecutions discussed here involved a supervising agent who 
seemed to have had any linguistic, cultural, or regional expertise that the 
agent could have used to challenge an informant’s version of events. 
Even in cases where a defendant’s links to or knowledge of terrorism 
exist independently of the informant, the discretionless use of informants 
is too problematic to justify its existence.303 
Given that informant use preys on groups that have been racialized as 
terrorists, the use of informants in its current form should end, much like 
what happened to the FBI’s COINTELPRO operation, which featured 
similar use of informants to spy on dissident groups within the United 
States in the 1960s and 1970s.304 Then, as now, informants often acted as 
provocateurs who drummed up prosecutions for crimes that would not 
have existed but for their involvement. The use of cooperators, however 
controversial in its own right, involves, at least in theory, a criminal 
conspiracy already in existence, not one that an informant created. Stated 
differently, there is a vast difference between 1) sending someone who 
has no law enforcement training to look for people from the Arab and 
Muslim community to see if they would be interested in a vaguely 
defined terrorist plot (especially when the informant offers money in 
return) and 2) enlisting an individual who was once part of a conspiracy 
or group to offer inside information (even if for money). The former 
operates in the hopes that focusing on a particular community will 
uncover terrorism, based on a general stereotype that that community 
has a propensity to engage in such activity. Theoretically, the latter at the 
very least has some inside information that would reflect the existence of 
terrorist activity. 
Calling for an end to the use of informants in terrorism prosecutions 
should not be perceived as drastic. The vast majority of Arabs and 
Muslims in the United States are not terrorists and the law generally 
disfavors guilt by association.305 Furthermore, a recent study indicates 
that Muslim-Americans are eager to cooperate with law enforcement 
                                                     
303. In the al-Moayad case, where the informant clearly was not the defendant’s only tie to 
terrorist groups, it was certainly questionable that the FBI relied so heavily on an individual who 
had an easily discoverable record of bad debts, family problems, and being fired from a position at 
the U.S. embassy in Yemen. See William Glaberson, Terror Case Hinges on a Wobbly Key Player, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at A1. 
304. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 
139–40 (2007); Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939, 952 
(2009). 
305. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 976 (2002) (“[T]he vast majority of 
persons who appear Arab and Muslim—probably well over 99.9 percent—have no involvement 
with terrorism.”). 
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when they perceive the police to be a legitimate authority whose 
practices are imbued with fairness and procedural justice.306 It is 
axiomatic that voluntary cooperation from the Muslim community with 
law enforcement to combat suspicious activity would be far superior to 
the current informant-driven practice. Eliminating informant use would 
certainly go a long way toward enhancing law enforcement’s legitimacy 
in the eyes of the Arab and Muslim communities, but will require a hard 
look at the preconceived notions fueling the phenomenon. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of informants in federal terrorist prosecutions has been an 
overall failure, despite its successes in procuring convictions in the 
courtroom. Individuals have been prosecuted where they did not 
represent a threat and the informant’s behavior could very well have 
prompted, as opposed to discovered, the criminal activity. When placed 
in the context of the racialization of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists, 
such results are understandable but not justifiable. Informant use, which 
has involved the informant playing a role akin to an undercover officer, 
should therefore cease in cases where there is no articulable suspicion of 
criminal wrongdoing. 
 
                                                     
306. Tyler et al., supra note 289, at 2–3.  
